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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
To Our Readers:
The Editorial Board of the University of Baltimore Law Forum,
Volume 48, proudly presents the first issue of the 2017-2018 academic
year. As the University of Baltimore School of Law's oldest journal, the
Law Forum publishes scholarly articles, student comments, and recent
developments concerning Maryland. This issue reflects the Law Forum 's
continued commitment to apprising the Maryland Legal community, as
well as the legal community as a whole, on developments in the law in
Maryland.
In this issue, we have the honor of publishing two student comments.
The first student comment, authored by Virginia J. Yeoman, presents a
critical look at Baltimore City's water billing system. The second student
comment, authored by Alicia M. Kuhns, discusses the negative effects of
Maryland's duty to retreat law. Lastly, the recent development pieces,
authored by Law Forum staff editors, examine eight interesting cases
decided this year by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and are intended
to keep Maryland practitioners and the legal community informed of the
status of the law in Maryland.
Production of a scholarly journal is a tremendous undertaking and
would not be possible without substantial contributions from the student
editorial board. I want to thank the entire Law Forum staff for their
tireless hard work, patience and diligence to complete this issue. I also
want to thank Professor Elizabeth J. Samuels, faculty advisor to the Law
Forum, for her guidance and support.
On behalf of the University of Baltimore Law Forum, we thank the
members of the Maryland legal community and our readers, for their
continued support and interest in our publication.
Sincerely,
John F. Simanski III
Editor-in-Chief
University ofBaltimore Law Forum - Vol. 48, No. 1
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews
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BALTIMORE CITY RISKS VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE WITH WATER SHUT-OFFS AND HOME
FORECLOSURES
By: Virginia J. Yeoman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Those who have lived in Baltimore in the past five or so years, and have
paid attention to local news, know that the city has problems with its water
billing system. Some Baltimore City residents have received an erroneous
bill and have tried to contact the Department of Public Works, only to be put
on hold or told there is nothing wrong with their bill. 2
Fortunately, Baltimore recently updated its decades-old water billing
system.3 Before October 2016, residents received their water bill every
quarter.' The amount was based on an estimated usage until the meters were
read, at which point the next quarter's bill estimate would be adjusted to
reflect the last quarter's actual reading.5 After October 2016, the city
switched to a monthly billing system with new "smart" meters that monitor
hourly water consumption.6
This comment discusses the flaws of both the old and new water billing
procedure, and the potential legal repercussions of using delinquent water
accounts as a basis to put homes into tax sale and/or shut off water in
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to
thank my faculty advisor, Jaime Lee, for her knowledge, guidance, and enthusiasm
throughout this process. I would also like to thank the entire staff of University of
Baltimore Law Forum for their hard work in editing this comment. Finally, a special
thank you goes to Kristen Mack, 2017 University of Baltimore School of Law
graduate, for first introducing me to this important topic.
' See discussion, infra Part III.
2 E.g., Danielle Sweeney, Some Still Struggle with Wildly Inaccurate Water Bills
from City, BALTIMORE BREw (July 13, 2015, 12:01 PM),
https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2015/07/13/some-still-struggle-with-wildly-
inaccurate-water-bills-from-city/ ("She contacted DPW immediately and - after
being placed on hold for over an hour - got some resolution .. . Robarge said she
repeatedly called the water department for an explanation to no avail. During her
most recent call, she was told the agency's computers were down.").
3 New Water Billing System, BALT. CITY DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS,
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residences. Part II explains how Baltimore City handles delinquent water
accounts- with tax liens and water shut-offs.' Part III analyzes the city's
history of erroneous water billing and the effect that inaccurate billing might
have on residents' Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.8 Finally, Part
IV proposes eliminating water bills from the tax sale process and prohibiting
water shut-offs until the new water billing system is proven to be accurate.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How a Delinquent Water Bill Can Lead to a Tax Sale
After a certain point, a delinquent water account can trigger a tax sale on a
person's property.9 In an investigative report published in 2014, Baltimore
journalist Joan Jacobson outlined the life cycle of the tax sale.'o The process
begins when Maryland property owners receive their bills for their annual
real property tax payments." These payments are considered delinquent by
the first of October if the owner is on an annual payment plan.12 The unpaid
bills create a first lien on the property.13 The lien ensures that "when the
property is sold or transferred to a new owner, the city or county must be
paid first before any mortgage company or other lien holder."14
If the bill is still outstanding, Baltimore City mails a "Final Bill and Legal
Notice" to the delinquent property owner." This is mailed in February, or at
least thirty days before the property is advertised for auction.16 The City also
sends a second "Tax Sale Notice" in April, which reminds the property
owner of the deadline for paying the lien before the tax sale occurs.17
The annual tax sale takes place in May through an online auction.18 Liens
that have remained unpaid are available to the highest bidder. 19 Once
7 See discussion, infra Parts H.A and II.B.
8 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .
9 See generally JOAN JACOBSON, THE STEEP PRICE OF PAYING TO STAY:
BALTIMORE'S TAX SALE, THE RISKS TO VULNERABLE HOMEOWNERS, AND
STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS (Abell Foundation 2014).
10 Id. at 9-12.




15 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 10.
16d.
18 City of Balt., Tax Sale Process, TAX SALE INFORMATION,
http://taxsale.baltimorecity.gov/tax-sale-process (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
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someone successfully bids on a certificate,20 that person receives the right to
recover the lien payment from the property owner.21 This payment includes
not only the original lien amount, but also interest and legal fees.2 2 Within
sixty days of the tax sale, the city must send notice to the original owner that
a certificate for the property was sold.23 The property owner has a period,
which can last between six months and two years, when he/she can redeem
the property.24 To do this, the owner must repay the lien certificate at an
eighteen percent interest rate.25 If all of the required amounts are not paid
within the redemption period, the lien-holder can petition a court to foreclose
the property owner's right to redeem and take ownership of the property.26
The foreclosure extinguishes all other mortgages and liens on the property,
and no compensation is given to the original owner for lost equity. 27
In 2014, Baltimore put 8,278 properties up for tax sale, while in 2013,
9,956 properties were included in the tax sale.28 According to Baltimore's
Tax Certificate Auction website, liens that are eligible for auction include
those on properties with delinquent real estate taxes, water bills, and other
municipal liens.29 If the lien is caused by a water bill, the "unpaid water bills
must be delinquent at least three quarters and have a balance of at least
$350.00 for non-owner-occupied properties and at least $750.00 for owner-
19 City of Balt., Tax Sale Process, TAx SALE INFORMATION,
https://taxsale.baltimorecity.gov/tax-sale-information-0 (last visited Oct. 14, 2017).
20 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 10 (a certificate represents the property owner's debt




24 Id. at 11.
25 See id. at 3 (describing the redemption process, "[Property owners] must pay the
liens, plus 18 percent interest and hundreds of dollars in court costs, legal fees and
postage. A $500 tax bill, for example, can climb to $3,000 two years after the tax
sale.").
26 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 11; City of Balt., Tax Sale Process, supra note 18
("The successful bidder may file a lawsuit to foreclose the right of redemption nine
months after the tax sale on owner occupied properties. Fees and most costs are
defined by State law and are owed to bidder, not to the City.").
27 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 11.
28 See Luke Broadwater, Baltimore to Send Water Turn-OffNotices to 25,000
Delinquent Customers, THE MD. PUB. POL'Y INST.,
http://www.mdpolicy.org/research/detail/baltimore-to-send-water-turn-off-notices-
to-25000-delinquent-customers (last visited December 29, 2016).
29 City of Balt., Tax Sale 2016 Calendar ofEvents, BALT. TAx CERTIFICATE
AUCTION WEB SITE, http://www.bidbaltimore.com (follow "Auction Schedule"
hyperlink) (last updated March 2016).
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occupied residential properties to qualify for tax sale."30 A resident can find
out if his/her property has been scheduled for a tax sale by contacting
Baltimore's Tax Sale Office.31
B. Water Shut-offs in Homes
Before an overdue water bill leads to a tax sale, Baltimore City may shut
off the property's water instead.3 2 As one of Baltimore City Council's
members said in 2015, "I like it better than taking people's houses and
putting them into foreclosure."3 3 The councilmember likened a water shutoff
to a gas and electric company or a cable company shutting off service to its
customers who fail to pay their bills.34 Other city officials believe that
initiating a water shutoff will help residents avoid foreclosure in the long
term.35
However, not everyone agrees that water shutoffs are the best route to
take. At a 2016 public hearing in Baltimore's City Hall, Delegate Mary
Washington testified, through a proxy, that disconnecting water service is a
public health threat.36 She also voiced her concern that shutting off water
violates international standards of human rights, as well as the fundamental
right to water and sanitation.37 At the same hearing, University of Baltimore
School of Law Professor Renee Hatcher also testified that water shutoffs
violate parental rights because a parent not having water is a basis for the
state to remove his/her children.
Critics have further contended that some businesses avoided water
shutoffs, while individual residents have been targeted.39 In 2015, city
30 City of Balt., Tax (Lien Certificate) Sale 2016 Frequently Asked Questions, BALT.
TAx CERTIFICATE AUCTION WEB SITE, http://www.bidbaltimore.com (follow
"FAQs" hyperlink, then follow "9. What delinquent charges qualify a property for
a Tax Lien Certificate Sale?" hyperlink) (last updated March 2016).
3 1 Id.
32 Broadwater, supra note 28 ("The city will move to shut off water only to
customers who have unpaid bills larger than $250 dating back at least half a year.").
33 Id. (quoting city council President Bernard C. Young).
34 Id.
3 See id. ("Turning off water before delinquent accounts grow too large can help
people stay in their homes, officials said.").
36 Informational Hearing - Water Affordability: Hearing on B. 16-0307R Before the
Tax'n, Fin., andEcon. Dev. Comm., City Council (Md. 2016).
37 Id.
38 Id.; see MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701 (West 2015) (defining "neglect" to
include "failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent ... under
circumstances that indicate: (1) that the child's health or welfare is harmed. . .").
39 See See Luke Broadwater, City Assailed for Shutting Off Water to Residents, Not
Businesses, The Balt. Sun (June 24, 2015),
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councilman Carl Stokes voiced his concern that "there were no cut-offs to the
commercial properties that owed $15 million or so," while residential cut-
offs numbered about three to four hundred per day.40 The Baltimore Sun
reported that in 2015, more than 350 commercial properties accounted for
$15 million in unpaid water bills.4 1 The Department of Public Works stated
that it had previously not attempted water shutoffs for businesses, but that it
would begin targeting businesses as well.42 By August of 2015, the city had
collected $3.6 million from commercial accounts of the $15 million owed.43
As of the same date, it had collected $21.8 million from residential accounts
of the $29.5 million owed."
As of October 2016, the Department of Public Works was still conducting
water shut-offs, and the Baltimore City Council was investigating the burden
these shut-offs placed on low-income residents and senior citizens.45 The
council issued a resolution in which they recognized that "universal access to
safe and affordable water and sewer service is necessary for public health,
community wellbeing, and basic human dignity."4 The council also
recognized that "without further action [from the City], more and more
households will struggle to pay their water bills." 47
Representatives from the Department of Public Works responded to the
criticism about water unaffordability by explaining that their new monthly
billing system, effective October 11, 2016, would help customers budget for
water better.48 The Department of Public Works also said that they had
implemented new meters that provide hourly consumption reads, which will
make the readings more accurate.49
III. ISSUE





42 Id. ("[Public Works Director Rudy Chow] said Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake
asked the agency this year to treat commercial entities the same as residents.").
43 Luke Broadwater, City Collects $25 Million Through Water Shut-OffNotices, THE
BALT. SuN (July 27, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-
city/bs-md-ci-shutoffs-update-20150727-story.html.
44 Id.
45 See Informational Hearing, supra note 36.
46 City of Balt. Council B. 16-0307R (Md. 2016).
47 Id.
48 See Informational Hearing, supra note 36 (testimony by Marcia Collins,
legislative liaison for Department of Public Works).
49 Id.
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Baltimore City has a history of overbilling its residents through the
Department of Public Works' erroneous water billing system.so Local news
sources have chronicled these mistakes throughout the years. For example,
The Baltimore Sun extensively covered the many billing errors in 2012,
which included city schools." At the time, former Baltimore Mayor
Stephanie Rawlings-Blake admitted that erroneous water billing was a "long-
standing problem," and that the billing had been "messed up for a long
time."52 Baltimore City Councilwoman Mary-Pat Clarke was also outspoken
about the erroneous water billing, and praised certain schools for withholding
payments until their bills were settled." She noted, however, that everyday
residents did not have this option due to the threat of liens turning into
foreclosures.' In fact, one court clerk even went so far as to file a lawsuit
against the city for failing to "collect water bills owed by businesses while
some residents were forced out of their homes for overdue bills."5
Evidently, that lawsuit did not go through, as the city ended up refunding
$4.2 million to city residents in 2012 for erroneous water billing.5 6 This
refund was based on an audit that examined water bills from 2009 to 2012."
The audit also found that "57 homes that were included in the city's tax sale
5o See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 2.
51 See Luke Broadwater and Erica L. Green, City Schools Overcharged on Water
Bills, THE BALT. SUN (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/education/bs-md-ci-schools-water-
bills-20121018-story.html ("City Public Works officials say they are adjusting water
bills for Baltimore public schools after several were overbilled this year by
thousands of dollars - including one school whose bill rose nearly $200,000.").
52 Id. (quoting Mayor Rawlings-Blake's statement regarding water billing problems:
"'We're working very hard to correct a long-standing problem,' she said. 'I want
people to understand that this has been messed up for a long time.. . . When
something's been messed up so long, it takes a lot of hours and human capital to
change it."').
53 Id.
54 Id. ("[Clarke] lamented that residents of.. .her district who have been overbilled
[] face liens on their homes if they don't pay up.").
5 See Court Clerk to Sue Baltimore Over Water Bills, WBALTV1 1 (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.wbaltv.com/article/court-clerk-to-sue-baltimore-over-water-
bills/7077179.
56 See Julie Sharper and Luke Broadwater, City Issuing $4.2 Million in Refunds for
Faulty Water Bills, THE BALT. SuN (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-02-22/news/bs-md-ci-water-audit-
20120222_1_new-meters-celeste-amato-baltimore-county.
" Id. (describing city auditor Robert L. McCarty's report: "The audit examined
water bills for 70,000 households over the past three years and found that 65,000
were likely overcharged and 53,000 of those showed no record of any adjustment.").
6 [Vol. 48.1
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due to unpaid water bills had bills that were based on estimates,"8 meaning
that the city deemed the account delinquent based only off their estimated
water consumption and not hard data.9
More recently, another audit of the city's water billing system for the year
2014 revealed that he problems were not over.60 The audit noted that while
the city had adjusted bills for the fiscal year 2011, there were "systemic
errors and limitations" that still existed as of the end of fiscal year 2014.61
70,000 accounts were affected by these errors, but this audit "will not trigger
more refunds because it did not identify specific accounts that were
overbilled."62 The Department of Public Works has told residents who are
concerned about their bill to call their customer support line.63
B. Due Process Conflict - Notice
If some of these residents have been overcharged without getting
refunded, the City of Baltimore may run into a due process problem. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires that a state shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."" This applies to municipal utilities like the Department of Public
Works, an agent of Baltimore City,65 for "receipt of utility service has been
held to constitute a constitutionally significant property interest."6
The Supreme Court, in Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division v. Craft,
held that customers must be given adequate notice of their procedural rights
58 Id.
5 Id. ("McCarty recommended that the water and wastewater employees take actual
meter readings at the homes before sending them to the tax sale.").
60 See Audit of City Spending by City Auditor Robert L. McCarty, Balt. City Board
of Estimates (2014); see also Luke Broadwater, Audit ofBaltimore Finances Shows
'Signficant Deficiencies' in Water Billing, Handling of Grant Money, THE BALT.
SUN (Sept. 23, 2016), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/sun-
investigates/bs-md-sun-investigates-audit-20160923-story.html.
61 Audit at 6 ("Controls were not adequately designed and operating effectively ...
Without proper controls in place over the water and waste water billing process,
misstatements to revenue and accounts receivable may occur and go undetected.").
62 Luke Broadwater, Audit ofBaltimore Finances Shows 'Significant Deficiencies' in




6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., ACCESS TO UTILITY SERVICE ( 5 th ed. 2011),
www.nclc.org/library ("Municipal utilities are cities and towns, or their agencies or
departments, which sell utility services to retail customers.").
66 Id. at 15.1.2.
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before the utility service is shut off. 67 In this case, the Craft family had been
repeatedly double-billed for their gas and electricity usage by the Tennessee
municipal utility company Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Division
(MLG&W).6 The Court concluded that MLGW&W's notice to the Crafts,
before terminating their service, was not adequate to comply with due
process requirements.69 Here, the company had mailed a final notice bill
warning that service would be shut off if payment was not received, in
addition to a flyer that directed customers who had trouble paying the bill to
call the office or go to a credit counseling station.70 The Court noted that
there was no assurance that the Crafts were even mailed that flyer, and that
the final bill only warned customers to pay or face termination and did not
explain any procedures for contesting a bill.71 These measures were thus
insufficient to justify shutting off the Crafts' utilities for nonpayment and
violated due process of law.72
Therefore, it is not enough that the utility service simply gives notice prior
to terminating service, but that it gives adequate notice. In Palmer v.
Columbia Gas of Ohio, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
differentiated between having a hearing process, and having a hearing
process that is made known to residents.74 In this case, while the gas
company did provide notice that service would be terminated if payment was
not received, the notice did not mention the steps a customer could take to
dispute the bill, nor did it mention special payment programs available.75
The court explained that "the mere theoretical possibility of informal
resolution cannot serve as a substitute for a mandatory procedural
67 Id.; see also Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
68 Craft, 436 U.S. at 4.
69 Id. at 14-15 ("Notice in a case of this kind does not comport with constitutional
requirements when it does not advise the customer of the availability of a procedure
for protesting a proposed termination of utility service as unjustified.").
70 Id. at 14.
71 Id. at 13-14.
72 See id at 15 ("As no [sufficient] notice was given to respondents--despite 'good
faith efforts' on their part-they were deprived of the notice which was their due.").
73 See Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1973)
("The due process clause requires, as a minimum, that parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be notified of the proposed action, and they are entitled to be
heard. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and to the opportunity to be
heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."); see also
Ilardi, The Right to a Hearing Prior to Termination of Utility Services, 22 BUFF. L.
REv. 1057, 1067-68 (1973) ("Essentially, the demand in the principal cases has been
for adequate notice of termination coupled with a right to an impartial hearing where
there is a dispute as to the propriety of the charge.").
74 Id. at 167-68.
7 Id. at 166 (stating "The company's shut-off notice does not provide the customer
with the information he needs to quickly and intelligently take available steps to
prevent the threatened termination of service.").
8 [Vol. 48.1
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mechanism designed to prevent unjust deprivations of important property
interests."76 This court thus upheld the District Court's order that before
terminating service, an employee of Columbia Gas must personally speak to
the resident, and if that is not possible, then the company must send notice
via certified mail with return receipt requested.77
C. Duties of Utility Companies
In addition to the due process concern, utility companies also have a
common law duty to serve.78  This duty to serve means that the utility
company must "render adequate and reasonably efficient service, on
reasonable terms, impartially, without unjust discrimination, and at
reasonable rates."79 A public utility company may be liable for damages for
failing to provide service to a customer to whom it is legally entitled.0
Moreover, the United Nations adopted a resolution in 2010 recognizing
water as a basic human right8 1 and called upon states and organizations to
provide financial resources to provide water for all.82 A fundamental
problem with Baltimore, Jacobson has said, is that "the city treats its water
utility like a private business instead of treating water like a human right." 83
In addition to the common law duty to serve, the Department of Public
Works must also follow Maryland consumer protection law, which prohibits
"unfair or deceptive trade practices."" Under this law, unfair or deceptive
trade practices include "representation that . . . consumer goods, consumer
realty, or consumer services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style,
76 Id. at 168.
77 Id. at 159, 169.
78 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 15, at 2.1.1 ("The duty to serve applies to
any company defined as a 'public utility' under common law, including municipal
utilities . .. ").
79 Id. at 2.2.2.
80 64 AM. JuR. 2D Public Utilities § 29, Westlaw (database updated November
2016); 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waterworks and Water Companies § 64, Westlaw (database
updated November 2016).
8 G.A. Res. 64/292, T 1 (July 28, 2010).
82 G.A. Res. 64/292, ¶ 2 (July 28, 2010) ("Calls upon States and international
organizations to provide financial resources, capacity-building and technology
transfer, through international assistance and cooperation, in particular to developing
countries, in order to scale up efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable
drinking water and sanitation for all.").
83 See Luke Broadwater, Amid Billing Change, Some Baltimore Homeowners Hit
with Water Bills of $35,000, $81,000, THE BALT. SUN (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-water-bills-
20161220-story.html.
84 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (West 2015).
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or model which they are not."" When a customer complains about an
abnormally high water bill, the norm for the Department of Public Works is
to assume that the problem is on the customer's end.86 In reality, it is likely
that the mistake is on the City's part," and so the services provided to the
consumer are potentially not of the "particular standard" that the City
claims."
Aside from the consumer protection aspect, Baltimore City has generally
not followed the adequate notice requirements set forth by the leading
cases.8 9 The Department of Public Works does not ensure that an employee
personally speaks to a resident before terminating service. There is anecdotal
evidence of residents unable to contest their bills before their water is shut
off. This is most apparent in situations where tenants pay the water bill. For
example, a seventeen-year-old girl living with her boyfriend in Harlem Park
lived without water for five months because their landlord had not paid the
bill." The couple reportedly relied on a neighbor for food and water, and
used kitchen pots and pans lined with plastic bags as toilets.91 Because the
property owner controls the water account, tenants have no voice in
contesting a water shut-off, even if the delinquent bill was through no fault of
their own.92 A Baltimore attorney suggested setting up tenant-controlled
water accounts so that the renter is protected from water shut-offs due to a
landlord's negligence.93 The Department of Public Works, however, says
tenants cannot be responsible for the water account because it is the property
owner who is ultimately responsible for tax liens.94
Even excluding landlord-tenant situations, there are enough situations
with owner-occupied properties and faulty water bills to warrant concern.
The fact that there has been substantial erroneous billing in the past, and that
85 Id.
86 See, e.g., Luke Broadwater, Protestors Call on Mayor to Stop Water Shut-Offs
Over Unpaid Bills, THE BALT. SuN (April 16, 2015, 8:31 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-ci-water-shutoffs-
20150416-story.html (relating how a Baltimore resident received a $3,700 water bill
and when he tried to contest it, "They tell you, 'Pay the bill.' The rest is on you.").
87 Id. (quoting a DPW customer, "I feel like it's pretty ridiculous to have a $3,700
water bill. We have a lot of unanswered questions.").
88 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (West 2015).
89 See Craft, 436 U.S. at 1; see also Palmer, 479 F.2d at 153.
90 Fern Shen, Baltimore's High Water Rates Violate U.N. Standards, Advocates Say,




92 See id (describing how a client of a Public Justice Center attorney was "hit by a
$685 erroneous water bill due to a burst water pipe but couldn't participate in the
discussion between the landlord and the Department of Public Works.").
9 Id. (quoting Public Justice Center attorney Zafar Shah).
94 Informational Hearing, supra note 36.
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systemic problems still exist, is troubling in light of a municipal utility's
common law duty to serve, the U.N.'s call to scale up efforts to provide
water, and the potential violation of due process rights Baltimore faces.
IV. SOLUTION
A New Meters are a Good Start, but Problems Persist
Of course, there is no simple solution to Baltimore's complicated water
billing problems. The city's recent switch to monthly bills instead of
quarterly bills, and the installation of new meters are a good start.95 The
Department of Public Works contends that these new water meters provide
hourly water consumption data which can be viewed online through a
property owner's personal account.96 This is an improvement to the old
billing system, which was based on a "predetermined, minimum amount of
water, regardless of how much customers actually used."97 Furthermore, the
new online personal account feature allows the customer to monitor water
usage in real time.98 Ideally, residents will pay attention to their water
consumption by checking their accounts, and thus will be more
knowledgeable about what their bill should look like. Having this check on
the system, from the customer's side, should help curb the frequency of
residents being blindsided by exorbitant bills.
However, the new system does not fix everything. Baltimore introduced
the new system in October of 2016.99 As a result, it is too early to know how
accurate the readings are on a large scale. Already, there have been reports
of more erroneous bills even with the new meters. 10 Additionally, The
" See New Water Billing System, BALT. CITY DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS,
https://publicworks.baltimorecity.gov/new-water-billing-system (last visited Jan. 5,
2017) (explaining that "monthly billing makes it easier for customers to manage
household budgets, detect leaks sooner, and find opportunities to adjust household
water usage.").
96 Id. ("The new meters are outfitted with technology that can collect and transmit
hourly and daily usage data.").
97 Press Release, BaltiMeter Billing Switches On, BALT. CITY DEP'T OF PUB. WORKS,
(Oct. 11, 2016), http://publicworks.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2016-10-
11 -baltimeter-billing- switches.
9 Id. ("About two weeks after they receive their first bill, account owners will get a
letter from DPW with information - including an activation code - that will help
them log into the new self-service portal. Customers will be able to use this secure
databank to see how much water they use hour by hour, thus alerting them to
unexpected water usage that could be costing them money.").
9 Press Release, supra note 97.
100 See Broadwater, supra note 83(relating that in addition to receiving water bills
that were obviously too high, some residents have not received any bills under the
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Department of Public Works itself "acknowledge[ed] that there have been
some issues."101 Until it can be proven that the new billing system is without
flaws, the city should not engage in water shut-offs nor should it include
water bills in the annual tax sale. Otherwise, Baltimore continues to expose
itself to the possibility of violating due process rights.
B. Other Cities'Property-Owners are Better Protected
Baltimore should look to other cities such as New York and Washington
D.C. to compare how they handle delinquent water accounts and tax lien
sales. According to Jacobson's Abell Foundation report, New York City's
tax sale laws are one of the most progressive and homeowner-friendly in the
country.10 2 For example, New York does not allow the sale of liens on
single-family homes for unpaid water bills, and the threshold for selling liens
on two and three-family homes stemming from delinquent water bills is
$2,000.103 Furthermore, New York "bans the sale of homes for back taxes
owned by low-income disabled and senior citizens, as well as veterans and
active military personnel."1" If a homeowner does lose his/her home in a tax
sale in New York, the interest rate charged for the homeowner to redeem the
house is only nine percent, as compared to Baltimore's eighteen percent.0 5
Finally, the law provides that the New York City Council receive a list of
homeowners who qualify for exemption from tax sales (low-income disabled
and senior citizens, veterans, active military personnel) from the city's
finance department so that the city council can then notify these homeowners
to file the appropriate paperwork which will ensure that their homes are
exempt from the sale.10 6 This type of proactive measure, aimed to protect
homeowners from foreclosures, is lacking in Baltimore when compared to
New York.107
Other parts of the country have also acted more efficiently and in a
manner that is more protective of its property owners than Baltimore.
Similar to New York, Washington D.C. has a law that prohibits owner-
new system, and some have paid their bill but have not been credited for their
payment).
101 Id.
102 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 26.
103 Id. at 27.
104 Id. at 26.
'os Id. (this interest rate applies to houses valued under $250,000).
106 Id. at 26-28 ("New York's Department of Finance must contact homeowners
eligible for exclusion from the sale by sending an 'eligibility checklist.' The
homeowner must follow up with a formal application for exemption. The city also
sends the New York City Council a list, broken down by councilman district, of
property owners who filled out the checklists but failed to submit a timely
application before the tax sale.").
"0 See discussion, supra Part HI.
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occupied homes with water liens to be sold. 108 Moreover, homes cannot be
sold at tax sale auctions if their liens are less than $2,500, and the interest
rate during the redemption period is twelve percent.1 ' And unlike
Baltimore, homeowners who do lose their home in a tax sale do not
necessarily lose all of the equity because of a protection in D.C. law."o In
Rhode Island, the state's housing agency investigates tax-delinquent, owner-
occupied properties and offers them help to prevent a tax sale.1 ' If a tax sale
does occur, the local government is allowed to sell the property to the
housing agency, which allows the homeowner to remain in their house for up
to five years with a monthly lien payment, instead of selling it to a private
bidder. 112
Baltimore could also learn from Detroit, a city that has had similar water
problems.1 3 In March of 2014, almost 19,500 Detroit residents had had their
water service interrupted as a result of the city responding to over $900
million in debt.1 14 Now, a group of activists and professors in Detroit have
conducted a study which shows that "the city's policy of shutting off water to
those who don't pay water bills is driving residents from their homes and
exacerbating the city's foreclosure crisis."1. This is not a position that
Baltimore wants to be in, as vacant homes are already a blight in the city.116
C. Baltimore Should Remove Water Bills from Tax Sales
108 JACOBSON, supra note 9, at 28.
109 Id.
1 0 Id. ("The D.C. law now requires any owner-occupied home subject to a tax sale
auction to be handled by the D.C. Superior Court through a trustee sale so any excess
proceeds will be turned over to the former homeowner.").
" Id. at 29.
112 Id. ("'By providing Rhode Island Housing, rather than private speculators, the
first option to purchase these liens, homeowners are helped rather than thrown out
into the street,' states a report from the state agency on early years of the program.").
113 See generally Bill Mitchell, In Detroit, Water Crisis Symbolizes Decline, and
Hope, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/special-
features/2014/08/14 0822-detroit-michigan-water-shutoffs-great-lakes/ (last visited
February 10, 2017).
114 id.
"' Bill Laitner, Detroit Group Says Water Shutoffs Add to Foreclosures, DETROIT
FREE PRESS (Aug. 11, 2016, 8:08 PM),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/2016/08/1 /detroit-group-says-water-shutoffs-add-
foreclosures/88593888/.
"6 See, e.g., Terrence McCoy, Baltimore Has More Than 16,000 Vacant Houses.




University of Baltimore Law Forum
Baltimore City should join New York, D.C., and Rhode Island, in
updating its tax lien sale laws. First and foremost, Baltimore should remove
delinquent water bills from the tax sale process. The evidence shows that
Baltimore's water billing system is seriously flawed, and therefore relying on
that system to instigate a foreclosure on someone's home is unjust. Even
more problematic, if the city were to auction off a lien from a delinquent
water bill that was proven to be erroneous, the city would have committed an
uncompensated taking which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process clause.
Maryland has previously held that in order to redeem a property that has
been auctioned in tax sale, the property owner must first pay all delinquent
taxes.117 In a 2006 case involving a property-owner who had not paid his
property taxes in seven years, the Maryland Court of Appeals concluded that
the property-owner's due process rights were not violated because he had
sufficient notice of the sale, and had plenty of time during the redemption
period to pay all of his delinquent taxes.'18 The appellant in this case argued
that his property had been unlawfully put in the tax sale and therefore his
foreclosure should be vacated.119 While the court found that there was not in
fact any illegality in putting the property into tax sale, the court made clear
that the appellant needed to pay all of his delinquent taxes regardless. 120
Some might argue that this holding applies to delinquent water bills, and
that a property-owner who loses their home from an unpaid water bill must
also pay the full amount owed during the redemption period if they wish to
contest the tax sale. These people might say that like the appellant in Canaj,
the property-owner's due process rights would not be violated if they never
paid the delinquent water bill. However, there is one big difference between
water bills and basic property taxes. In Canaj, the fact that the appellant
1' See Canaj, Inc. v. Baker and Division Phase III, LLC, 893 A.2d 1067 (Md. 2006)
(holding that payment of delinquent taxes is a condition precedent o delinquent
taxpayer's right to seek a vacation of foreclosure judgment).
118 Id. at 1098 ("[A]ppellant's due process argument is entirely without merit. It was
on notice that taxes were overdue; it was on notice that the properties were to be
disposed of at the tax sale; and, it had ample opportunity to contest any of the sales
or pay the taxes due.").
"' Id. at 1074 (relating a previous hearing in which appellant argued that the City
had illegally put his properties into tax sale).
120 Id. at 1077 ("We have never overruled the holding of our cases that where it is
admitted (or proven) that there are delinquent taxes due, in order to challenge the
holding or ratification of the tax sale or to seek to vacate a judgment of the
foreclosure of the equity in redemption, the taxpayer must first pay to the Collector
or the certificate holder the total sum of the taxes, interest, penalties and expenses of
the sale that are due. While not recently addressed, it remains the law in this State.").
14 [Vol. 48.1
2017] Baltimore City Risks Violation 15
of Due Process Clause
owed payment to Baltimore City was uncontested. 121 Basic property taxes
are easy to track and are a fixed amount. Water bills, on the other hand,
depend on personal consumption and are different to every household. The
amount owed differs every bill period. Baltimore City has accidentally
overbilled its residents many times, and has admitted to doing so. A house
being sold at tax sale because of an erroneous water bill, therefore, is
markedly different from a house being sold due to unpaid property taxes.
There is a much greater risk of error with water bills, as the city has proven
over and over again.
The policy concerns between delinquent property taxes and a delinquent
water bill are different as well. With Canaj, if the city had stopped the
foreclosure and given the appellant his property back before he paid his
delinquent taxes, "the City would be left where it was before the tax sale."1 22
That is, the appellant would still owe the same amount of property taxes. 123
If a home is foreclosed on due to an erroneous water bill, in contrast, the city
would not be left where it was before the tax sale if the homeowner were
able to get his property back. The city would simply need to fix the billing
error, and if the owner had been overcharged, then it is possible that the
owner could pay the correct amount.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, the stakes are too high, and the risk of Baltimore overbilling on
water is too high, for a water bill to be included in the tax lien sale. Instead
of sending the properties of vulnerable residents into the hands of predatory
investors, Baltimore should take a more protective approach to holders of
delinquent water accounts. The city should offer more financial assistance
programs to those who have trouble paying for water, and should advertise
these programs more.124 If water bills remain in the tax sale, it is only a
matter of time before the unreliable billing system overcharges someone and
that person's property is taken without just compensation.
121 Id. at 1073 ("There are no contested facts relating to whether the taxes have, in
fact, been paid. All parties to the present appeal agree that taxes have not been
paid.").
122 Id. at 1080.
123 See Canaj, 893 A.2d at 1080 ("The public would be burdened perpetually with
the problems created by the thousands of abandoned properties, which the delinquent
owner would be unlikely to ever pay taxes on . . ").
124 See DETROIT FREE PRESS, supra note 115 (Detroit has a "simple installment plan
that lets those who've fallen behind on water bills keep up .. . In addition, we will
come out and do a free assessment of your house, look for leaks and pay $1,000
toward fixing your leaks if you qualify on the basis of low income . . .").
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Finally, Baltimore should end its practice of shutting off people's water.
As water is considered a fundamental human right,125 no city should
voluntarily render its citizens without access to water. It is noteworthy that
Maryland Code has a section which provides regulations for turning off gas
and electricity to low-income customers.126 The statute provides that "the
Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or
limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for
gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating
season for nonpayment."127 One of these regulations that the Commission
considers is "the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health,
and safety."1 28 Evidently, Maryland legislators were concerned about people
losing their heat in cold weather. Yet, there is no parallel provision saying
that the Commission must adopt regulations regarding shutting off water,
which is arguably just as necessary for health and safety as heat is. The State
should have the same concern for low income residents losing access to
water as it does for residents losing heat. Perhaps Baltimore City should
adopt its own regulations for cutting off water to low income residents and
inspire the rest of Maryland to do the same.
In fact, as with the tax sale, if the city shuts off water based on an inflated
bill, the city risks taking property in violation of due process rights.129 It thus
would not only be a generally progressive move for the city to enact water
shut-off regulations, but would also help the city avoid encountering a
Constitutional violation. In other words, the city would look good publicly
while at the same time covering itself from legal repercussions. Therefore, it
is in the best interest of both Baltimore City and its citizens to find another
way to settle delinquent water accounts.130 In brief, the billing system is
simply too faulty to base house foreclosures and water shut-offs on overdue
water bills.
125 G.A. Res., supra note 81.
126 See Md. Code Ann., Pub. Util. § 7-307 (West 2013) ("Termination of gas or
electric services to low income customers").
127 id.
128 Id. at ¶ (b)(2)(i).
129 See discussion, infra Part III.B.
130 See NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, supra note 113 (describing various fundraisers
begun on social media to help residents in Detroit who lost water: "Another
conversation-this one on Twitter between two women on opposite sides of the
country-led to an initiative called the Detroit Water Project ... Three weeks later,
the project they had built had poured more than $84,000 into the water department
on behalf of more than 700 customers.").
16 [Vol. 48.1
COMMENT
WHY MARYLAND SHOULD STAND ITS GROUND INSTEAD
OF RETREAT
By: Alicia M. Kuhns*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a majority of states do not require one faced with the
threat of death to attempt a retreat before defending themselves.' These
states employ stand your ground laws which bar the prosecution of
individuals who use deadly force against a deadly aggressor without first
attempting to retreat.2 A minority of states, including Maryland, enforce a
duty to retreat instead of stand your ground.3 Under a duty to retreat, a
defendant may not successfully claim self-defense if he could have safely
retreated, but failed to do so, before using deadly force against a deadly
attacker.4 However, the line between stand your ground and duty to retreat is
not clear cut.5 Doctrines, such as the English common law's Castle Doctrine,
have blurred the line on when retreat is required.6 As a result, many states
have expanded the traditional Castle Doctrine to apply to guests, cohabitants,
places of business, etc., making the rule of retreat more obsolete.
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to
thank the staff of the University of Baltimore Law Forum for all their hard work
throughout the drafting process. Also, I would like to give a special thanks to my
faculty advisor, Professor Donald H. Stone, for his guidance, thoughtful critiques,
and overall support during the comment process.
Cynthia V. Ward "Stand Your Ground" and Self-Defense, 42 Am. J. Crim. L. 89.
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2014) ("A person who uses or threatens to use force
as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is justified in such conduct and
is immune from criminal prosecution for the use or threatened use of such force ...
."); Dorsey v. State, 74 So.3d 521, 526 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the
legislative intent of section 776.013 to abolish the common law duty to retreat).
2Id
4 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53(a)-19(b) (2014) ("[A] person is not justified in
using deadly physical force upon another person if he or she knows that he or she
can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety (1) by retreating ...
."); see also Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (Md. 1997) (citations omitted)
(stating that Maryland's common-law retreat rule requires a person "to retreat or
avoid danger if such means were within his power and consistent with his safety" as
an essential element to self-defense).
5 Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida's Castle Doctrine for the Twenty-
First Century, 4 Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 504, 505 (2007).
6Id
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This comment will analyze Maryland's duty to retreat in comparison to a
majority of states' adoption of stand your ground laws. Particularly, it will
examine the effects of the duty to retreat on innocent victims and the law's
conflict with the Castle Doctrine. Part II will discuss the background of duty
to retreat and Castle Doctrine in the United States and the interplay between
the two in Maryland. Part III will explain the negative effects of duty to
retreat, particularly on women and victims of domestic violence. Part IV will
propose moving away from a duty to retreat in Maryland towards stand your
ground. To provide support for advocating change in Maryland, a
comparative analysis of Maryland to other states that have passed similar
laws will be conducted.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Self-defense in America
In early England, a man convicted of homicide who claimed self-defense
could not be acquitted unless the murder was done in the execution of law.
This left citizens who acted in self-defense with one option to avoid
execution, receiving a pardon from the King.8 As a result of this limited
option, the pardoning process began to become a formality and eventually
self-defense became a defense.9 However, one raising the defense still had
limitations, having to prove the individual acted out of necessity.'0 Along
with the doctrine of necessity, citizens were also required to first retreat
before acting in self-defense, unless in one's own home." In response to
England's worry that "the right to defend might be mistaken as the right to
kill," they safeguarded the law by requiring a man to "retreat to the wall"
before acting, and thus began the doctrine of a duty to retreat.12
While the formation of the United States was built on English principles
and common law, after its separation from England the United States began
to move away from English common law.13 America transitioned into its
own ideologies and beliefs'4 such as ideals of honor, bravery and a right to




" Id. at 574.
12 F. Baum & J. Baum, LAw OF SELF-DEFENSE 6 (1970).
13 Id.
14 Richard Maxwell Brown, Southern Violence--Regional Problem or National
Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Towards Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective, 32
VAND. L. REv. 225, 232 (1979).
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self-defense.15 As these ideologies were developing, so too were the laws of
this country.16 With the make-up of the American frontier vastly differing
from England, so did the duty to retreat.'7 Many in the United States began
to find importance in the right to defend one's honor and home.18
The Supreme Court eventually made a decision based on these American
ideologies, giving them legal validity in 1895 when it solidified the Castle
Doctrine in American Law.19 In Beard v. United States, the Court stated that
there was at least one place "where a man need not retreat any further, where
he need not go away from the danger, and that is in his dwelling-house."2 0
The concept of self-defense also had deep roots in American state courts.21
Early cases displayed the importance of a man's ability to repel force in
defense of himself, his home, or when one manifests an intent to commit a
felony against him. 22  These strong American ideologies favoring self-
defense resulted in states extending the non-duty to retreat.23 This extension
started with the home, as set down by the court in Beard, by states
eliminating retreat in any situation where there was a threat of imminent
death or severe bodily harm.24 This change was based on society's increased
understanding of human nature and the complicated measurement of one's
morals that a duty to retreat required in situations where reflection could not
be demanded in the presence of such imminent danger.2 5
In such a case he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his
adversary till he find himself out of danger; * * * [T]he right
of self-defense in cases of this kind is founded on the law of
nature; and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of
society. * * * The right extends to the protection of the
person from great bodily harm.26
1 CHARLES S. SYDNOR, THE PURSUIT OF SOUTHERN HISTORY, THE SOUTHERNER AND




19 Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 555 (1895).
20 I
21 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, 5th ed., sec. 865.
22 Wharton on Criminal Law, vol. 2, sec. 1019.
23 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
24 Id.
2 5 Id.
26 Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 83-84 (Sup. Ct. 1877).
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As the country increased towards urbanization, this concept of no duty to
retreat began to vary in certain areas.27 States differed on the level of force
available in defending one's self and the varying circumstances applicable to
self-defense.28 Some of these varying circumstances related to the party
whom one is defending, i.e. himself, his family or his home.29 In remaining
consistent with the underlying principles found in the Castle Doctrine of the
privilege of non-retreat and protection of life, liberty, and property, many
states enacted a right to stand one's ground with honor and the freedom to
defend.30 And while a majority of states moved away from a duty to retreat
to a stand your ground law, some states still use this doctrine, including
Maryland.3 1 However, all states have an exception under the Castle
Doctrine, which allows a person attacked in their home to stand their ground
and fight.3 2
The Castle Doctrine is not only limited to the physical dwelling, however,
since there is a general acknowledgement among the states that one is not
required to retreat from his own curtilage.33 The difficulty in determining
what is considered part of the "curtilage" is one of the reasons so many states
began to move toward expanding the Castle Doctrine.3 4 Using "curtilage" to
define a dwelling where one need not retreat extended the doctrine to include
outbuildings, yards and gardens around the home and porches.35 States began
to extend this non-retreat area to include spaces outside the curtilage but still
on one's own grounds.36 This area has even been extended by some states to
include an occupied vehicle37 or a tent.38
This extension is not uniform among all states. Some states have
extended the doctrine further to other persons and other forms of one's
"castle," such as businesses.3 9 Some courts even refer to the stand your
27 See James D. Brewer, The Danger From Strangers: Confronting The Threat Of
Assault 119 (1994) ("The security that comes from knowing how to protect yourself
cannot be equaled.").
28 See Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Law 228 (3d ed. 2001).29 Id
30 Christine Catalfamo, Stand Your Ground: Florida's Castle Doctrine for the
Twenty First Century, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 504 (2006-2007).
3 Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle Doctrine, and Self-
Defense, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 653, 663 (2003).32 Id
" See Hicks v. State, 108 So. 612 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926); State v. Frizzelle, 89 S.E.2d
725 (N.C. 1955); State v. Brooks, 60 S.E. 518 (S.C. 1908).
34 40 Am Jur. 2d Homicide § 165.
3 5 Id.
36 State v. Quick, 135 S.E. 800 (S.C. 1926).
3 Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
38 State v. Marsh, 593 N.E.2d 35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (stating there is no duty to
retreat from a nearby camper who threatens violence).
39 See State v Sipes, 209 N.W. 448 (Iowa 1926); See e.g., Commonwealth v.
Johnston, 263 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1970) (stating that dwelling expressly extended to
20 [Vol. 48.1
Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
ground law as the "American Rule,"" which holds that one is not required to
retreat whether he is attacked at home or elsewhere; instead, he can stand his
ground.4 1 This further illustrates the deep roots of the stand your ground
laws in the United States.42
B. Maryland's Duty to Retreat and Extension of the Castle Doctrine
Maryland is in the minority of states requiring a duty to retreat before
acting in self-defense.43 Maryland requires one "to retreat or avoid danger if
such means [are] within his power and consistent with his safety."" In order
to invoke a successful defense, a defendant must show that it was not
possible to retreat safely.45 This requires a defendant to show that he could
not retreat at all or that he had already retreated as far as possible.'
The one exception to Maryland's duty to retreat is the Castle Doctrine.47
This doctrine derives from the principle "that 'a man's home is his castle' and
his ultimate retreat."48 If a man is attacked in his own home he is not
required to retreat in order to escape the danger.49 Instead of retreat, a man
may stand his ground and, if it is necessary to stop the attacker, he may use
deadly force.50
Following many other states, Maryland has extended the Castle Doctrine
to include protection for those other than the homeowner.51 In determining
that retreat is not necessary for guests, the Maryland Court of Appeals
adopted the reasoning of Justice Cardozo in People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496,
497-98 (N.Y. 1914):52
include one's place of business); See e.g., State v. Hayes, 502 S.E.2d 853 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1998) (holding that there is no duty to retreat assault occurs in the dwelling,
place of business, or premises of the person assaulted, provided the person assaulted
is free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.).
4 Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. 1986).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 See Gainer v. State, 391 A.2d 856 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); DeVaughn v. State,
194 A.2d 109, 112 (Md. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 527 (1964); Burch, 696 A.2d
at 458.
4 Bruce v. State, 145 A.2d 428, 433 (Md. 1958).
45 Barton v. State, 420 A.2d 1009 (Md. Ct. Spec App. 1980).
46 Id
47 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 860-61.
48 Id.
49 Id.
5o Crawford v. State, 190 A.2d 538, 541 (Md. 1963).
5 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 861-62.
52 Id.
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It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed
in his own dwelling is bound to retreat. [W]hy ... should
one retreat from his own house, when assailed by a partner
or cotenant, any more than when assailed by a stranger who
is lawfully upon the premises? Whither shall he flee, and
how far, and when may he be permitted to return?13
The court's use of Justice Cardozo's logic demonstrates that Maryland has
favored protecting those within a home, regardless of the status of the
attacker.54  This strong application of the Castle Doctrine displays
Maryland's belief that self-defense of anyone in the home, regardless of their
status, should come before the rights of the attacker.5 '
In defining what constitutes a home or dwelling, the Maryland courts
have quoted the Restatement of Torts Second: "any building or habitation, or
part of it, in which the actor is at the time temporarily or permanently
residing and which is in the exclusive possession of the actor, or of a
household of which he is a member."5 6 And while the Restatement narrowly
defines a dwelling to only those areas used as a residence, it broadly extends
the Castle Doctrine to include temporary guests.s" The Maryland courts
ultimately confirmed this extension, ruling that a lower court's decision not
to apply the Castle Doctrine to one residing in a residence temporarily as a
guest was too restrictive.5 8 In doing so, it held that the Castle Doctrine must
be interpreted in a broader sense to include temporary guests as members of
the household.59  For purposes of self-defense, a temporary guest is
considered to be in his own dwelling and therefore has no duty to retreat.o
This extension is modified, however, by excluding those who come to the
house with some purpose other than residing, such as a business visitor.6 1
Along with extending the Castle Doctrine to include guests, Maryland has
also eliminated the requirement to retreat for multiple habitants of a
residence.62 This move towards expanding the Castle Doctrine and lowering
the requirement for retreat has been further demonstrated in Maryland's
decisions regarding self-defense in one's place of business.63  While the
Maryland courts have not made a decision in criminal cases, Section 5-808
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code
5 Id.
54 Id.
5 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 861-62.




60 Barton, 420 A.2d at 1011-12.
61 Id.
62 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 861-62.
63 Id.
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addresses it on a civil level."4 This statute gives immunity from civil
lawsuits for the use of force to defend one's home or business.6 5 Therefore,
it is arguable that this statute makes the Castle Doctrine applicable to actions
committed to defend a person's business." And even though there is no
immunity if a Defendant has been convicted of certain charges in connection
with the incident, the statute shows a further extension of the Castle Doctrine
in Maryland. This demonstrates that Maryland has moved towards
lowering the standards for the requirement of retreat in self-defense cases.68
III. THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF MARYLAND'S DUTY TO
RETREAT
A. A Duty to Retreat Has Negative and Disproportionate Impact on
Women
Maryland's duty to retreat raises gender-sensitive issues because of its
disproportionate impact on females.69 Among those harmed by the duty to
retreat are domestic violence victims who turn on their assailants.7 0
Maryland provides an exception from a duty to retreat for co-habitants.7 1
This protects domestic violence victims who act in self-defense in their
homes.7 2 However, the exception requires them to retreat when faced with
danger after leaving the abusive home, when the level of danger can be
heightened. Once out of the home, the Castle Doctrine will not apply and a
victim will be required to retreat before defending against her abuser.74 As a
result, this law discourages women who live with their abusers from
removing themselves from dangerous relationships.
Women are abused in an estimated twelve percent of all marriages.76
Maryland's co-habitant exception for women in their home creates a gap in





69 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 2000 Table 3.17 at 196 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann Pastore eds., 2001).
70 1Id.
71 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 861-62.
72 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue of




76 Judith E. Koons, Gunsmoke and Legal Mirrors: Women Surviving Intimate
Battery and Deadly Legal Doctrines, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 617, 657 (2006).
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protection for domestic violence victims choosing to leave the home. Only
providing self-defense protection for battered women in the home exposes
women to a greater danger of abuse.78 Furthermore, when considering the
phenomenon of separation assault, the requirement of retreat could cause
women more harm.79
Separation assault is an attack on the woman's body in which her partner
keeps her from leaving, retaliates if she tries to separate herself, or forces her
to return.so Therefore, a decision to retreat from the home can trigger the
danger of death or bodily harm for the woman. In these types of cases, a
duty to retreat requires a woman who has left the home to retreat if her
abuser finds her and retaliates, instead of acting in self-defense.82 A law that
supports battered women in the home, but does not protect them once they
leave, discourages women from removing themselves from dangerous
relationships.
B. Maryland's Duty to Retreat Has the Potential to Promote the Wrong
Public Policy
Maryland's duty to retreat also harms female victims on a broader scale. 84
Many feminists support stand your ground laws because they find that the
logic "you could have run away" may not work when faced with a stalker or
other predator. An innocent woman threatened by a much more powerful
male criminal should not have to worry about whether she must retreat in
order to avoid prosecution.86
Policy concerns for preserving human life should be greater than
protecting those engaged in unlawful actions.8 ' This ideology has deep roots
in American culture. In 1876, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted the
importance of this policy concern:89
n Id. at 657.
7 8 Id.
79 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue of





84 Ilya Shapiro, Don't Retreat on 'Stand Your Ground' Laws, NATIONAL REVIEW,




87 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Sup. Ct.1876).
88 Id. at 200.
89 Id.
24 [Vol. 48.1
Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
The law which is best calculated to protect and preserve
human life, is of great weight, and we can safely say, that the
rule announced is, at least, the surest to prevent the
occurrence of occasions for taking life; and this, by letting
the would-be robber, murderer, ravisher, and such like, know
that their lives are, in a measure, in the hands of their
intended victims.'
A duty to retreat is not only against public policy for preserving innocent
human lives, but it also goes one step further by not protecting those acting
in self-defense of another.91 An example of such a case is State v. Barlow,
where the defendant invoked the stand your ground defense for using deadly
force while protecting a third person. 92 In an effort to stop someone from
raping an unconscious victim, the defendant pointed a gun and injured the
assailant.9 3 The Supreme Court of Kansas found that the policy concern for
protecting those acting in self-defense for others was so strong that they
allowed the stand your ground immunity statute to override a jury's verdict. 94
Because a district judge had decided before sentencing that the immunity
applied, the Supreme Court affirmed and vacated Barlow's attempted second-
degree murder conviction, ultimately dismissing that charge.95 The stand
your ground law was found to apply under the theory that his use of force
was necessary to protect another.9 6
Unlike stand your ground, as illustrated by Barlow, duty to retreat puts the
person attacked at the focus of criminal law instead of the original assailant,
thus creating huge policy concerns.97 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote
in the 1921 case of Brown v. United States, that "detached reflection cannot
be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife." 98 Nearly a century later,
we should not demand more of crime victims.9
A duty to retreat puts victims at an unfair advantage in more ways than
one.1" Maryland's own case law has demonstrated a concern for victims
who cannot defend themselves because of a difference in weight or height,
90 Id.
9' State v. Barlow, 303 Kan. 804 (Sup. Ct. 2016).
92 Id. at 805.
9 Id. at 806.
94 Id. at 817.
9s Id.
96 Id. at 805.




100 Bruce, 145 A.2d at 433
2017]1 25
University of Baltimore Law Forum
most common with women against men.o10 Therefore, requiring victims to
retreat contradicts Maryland's own public policy. 10 2  Furthermore, not
protecting third parties who act to defend the most vulnerable further
promotes policy favoring the rights of criminals over the protection of the
innocent.o
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND TO OTHER
STATES SUPPORTS A CHANGE IN MARYLAND'S
RETREAT LAW
There are many differences among the states in their applications of stand
your ground.10 This has resulted in different procedural requirements for
stand your ground laws.05 For example, states differ in their tests for when
stand your ground can apply in the first place.10 6 In Kansas, when a
defendant raises justification for use of force because he was "standing his
ground" in self-defense, a probable cause standard is used by the court. The
Kansas Supreme Court ruled that a judge can sua sponte overturn a jury
verdict by finding that the state failed to meet its substantially lesser burden
in showing probable cause that a crime was committed, that the defendant
committed it, and that any argument that the defendant used lawful force, by
standing his ground, was without merit. 107
States have also employed requirements for when a defense of stand your
ground law cannot be raised.108 In holding that a defendant cannot raise
stand your ground for the first time on appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court
noted the importance of the statute's purpose.109 It noted that the purpose of
the statute is to protect individuals from the burdens of prosecution and
conviction.1 10 Therefore, that purpose cannot be effected when immunity is
raised for the first time on appeal since prosecution and conviction have
occurred."' This helps prevent the abuse of stand your ground as a "last
shot" defense.112
10' Id. (considering the character of the deceased and the evidence of disparity in the
size and weight between the parties in determining if the accused acted in self-
defense).
102 Id.
104 See Barlow, 303 Kan. at 804; State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 843-44. (Sup. Ct.
2013).
1os Barlow, 303 Kan. at 815.
10 6 id.
107 Id. at 817.






Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
A. Stand Your Ground Laws Offer Other Safeguards That Promote the
Same Public Policy as Duty to Retreat but Better Protect Vulnerable
Victims
A majority of states have expanded the Castle Doctrine and enacted stand
your ground instead of duty to retreat.113 In doing so, those states have
employed other safeguards that protect the concerns of duty to retreat
legislatures without prioritizing the rights of criminals over innocent
victims.114 Utah's stand your ground statute still requires a duty to retreat
when the person exercising self-defense was the initial aggressor or was in
combat by agreement."' Furthermore, when a person has unlawfully entered
a premise, such as a trespasser, they must retreat before exercising the right
to self-defense.1 6
While Florida also follows stand your ground, it, like Utah, has other
safeguards in place to make sure that the defense of self-defense is not
mistreated."' A person is justified in using deadly force if "he or she
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent
commission of a forcible felony; or" in protection of their home (Castle
Doctrine includes dwelling, residence or occupied vehicle)."' This ruling
demonstrates that Florida still has a reasonable and imminence
requirement."9  Florida follows the majority of states who have also
eliminated duty to retreat but still require a level of imminence and
reasonableness.120
This standard of imminence functions similarly to the retreat rule.'2'
However, while retreat rules ask jurors to consider why a defendant did not
attempt to retreat, the imminence requirement encourages jurors to ask
whether there was time to retreat.12 2 This lifts the duty on the victim to
" See Gainer, 391 A.2d 856; DeVaughn, 194 A.2d at 112; Bruce, 145 A.2d at 433;
Burch, 696 A.2d at 458.
114 Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
11 Id. at 624.
116 Id
" Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
118 Id. at 220.
119 Id.
1 20 id.
121 Susan L. Pollet, Economic Abuse: The Unseen Side ofDomestic Violence, 83
N.Y. ST. B.J., 40, 40-41 (2011); Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety:
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retreat while still asking the jury to consider the possibility of retreat as one
factor in determining self-defense.12 3
On top of the imminent and necessity requirement, some states go one
step further, employing safeguards in an effort to stringently evaluate the
threat of the assailant.124 Pennsylvania's stand your ground law demands
imminence and necessity along with requiring that the person against whom
the force is used displays, or otherwise uses, a firearm or other weapon
capable of lethal use.125 This further protects against the misuse of self-
defense by requiring more proof that the alleged threat was reasonable.126
This law effectively protects the innocent rather than those engaging in
criminal or illegal conduct.12 7 It allows those faced with a reasonable threat
of danger from someone with a lethal weapon to defend themselves, while
also requiring the reasonableness of the threat to be defined in a narrower
sense with the requirement of a lethal weapon. 128
As one of the more recent states to adopt stand your ground laws,
Pennsylvania also modified the immediacy and necessity requirements found
in many other state statutes.129 Under Pennsylvania's new statute, a person
does not have to retreat if he "believes it is immediately necessary to do so to
protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping, or sexual
intercourse by force or threat."30 This means that if the attacker tries to flee
the scene, the use of force against him is no longer justified.'3 1
Pennsylvania's modification prevents those that would abuse this defense
from doing so in times when deadly force is no longer justified because the
threat has ended. 132
Other states have recognized the importance of expanding the Castle
Doctrine, resulting in a "middle ground" approach between duty to retreat
and stand your ground.'33 Washington D.C. imposes no duty to retreat, but
instead, "permits the jury to consider whether a defendant, if he safely could
have avoided further encounter by stepping back or walking away, was
actually or apparently in imminent danger of bodily harm." 34 It allows the
jury to determine whether the defendant acted too hastily and was too quick
to pull the trigger.135 And while there is no duty to retreat, there can be a
123 Id
124 Commonwealth v. Childs, 142 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2016).
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Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
failure to retreat if, with all the surrounding circumstances, the jury
determines the case was not truly one of self-defense.136
Maryland's decision in extending the Castle Doctrine to include a place of
business is similar to other states who eventually abandoned a duty to retreat
for stand your ground.13 7 Some states' laws, such as Pennsylvania, also
required one to retreat before acting in self-defense with the Castle Doctrine
exception.1  Similar to Maryland, Pennsylvania began to slowly extend the
Castle Doctrine to include one's place of business, eliminating a duty to
retreat.139 This extension by Pennsylvania ultimately led to it enacting a
stand your ground law. 140
Mississippi is another state that employed a place of business exception
and eventually enacted stand your ground.141 It did so by changing the
language of its statute to require no duty to retreat if one is in a place where
he has a right to be.142 Here, the law allows a defendant to claim self-defense
even if the opportunity to flee and avoid the danger existed, if the appropriate
circumstances existed at the time.'43  These circumstances include the
requirement that a person be in a place where he has a right to be, and is not
the aggressor.'" Furthermore, the person must take care that his resistance is
not disproportional to the attack.145
As demonstrated by Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and many other states, the
natural progression of extending the Castle Doctrine in Maryland follows
other states that have done away with a duty to retreat.1'" Many states, like
Maryland, have also extended the Castle Doctrine to include co-habitants.14 7
In doing so, the courts recognized the policy that two people who share a
residence have "equal rights to be in the castle" and neither has the right to
eject the other.148 And while some states may not have extended the Castle
Doctrine per se, they still found other ways to protect co-habitants who acted
in self-defense by applying a completely new approach.149
136 Id.
131 Commonwealth v. Johnston, 263 A.2d 376 (Pa. 1970)
138 Id. at 380.
1
39 Id. at 379.
140 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505 (2017).
141 Craig v. State, 660 So.2d 1298, 1297 (Miss. 1995).
142 Id.
143 Haynes v. State, 451 So. 2d 227, 229 (Miss. 1984).
144 Long v. State, 52 Miss. 23, 34 (Sup. Ct. 1876).
145 Id. at 34.
146 See Little, 111 So.3d at 214, State v. Brown, 467 S.E.2d 922 (S.C. 1996), Cooper,
512 A.2d at 1006, State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 336 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
1 47 Id.
148 See e.g., Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999).
149 Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1006.
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This new approach was created by the Washington D.C. court.150 The
court seemed to favor giving Castle Doctrine instructions in cases of co-
occupants, stressing the occupant's interest in remaining in the home."' And
while they ultimately did not extend Castle Doctrine to co-occupants, they
did not necessarily require retreat either.15 2 Instead, they created a "middle
ground" approach, having a jury consider all the circumstances.153 Allowing
failure to retreat to be considered with all the other circumstances
surrounding the incident helped to determine whether the case was truly one
of self-defense.154 These circumstances are based on the facts surrounding
the incident and include the possibility of retreat, the defendant's belief that
death was imminent, and whether the defendant was too quick to pull the
trigger.155
While Maryland holds that there is no duty to retreat when both the
aggressor and the victim are in the victim's castle, it still has not moved
toward eliminating a duty to retreat.156  Maryland's policy concerns for
protecting victims when they are in a dwelling seems to disappear once they
are outside.157 Furthermore, when the Maryland court defined dwelling, it
used the reasoning of Crawford v. State, stating that the rules of defending
one's dwelling are generally similar to those of defending one's person.15
8
This demonstrates that the logic behind the Maryland court's decision in
eliminating a duty to retreat from the home is the same as one's person.159
Maryland's extension of this doctrine shows that the law could be leaning
more towards a version of stand your ground law. 16
In Maryland, self-defense falls under justified homicide.161 A homicide is
only considered justified when one was not the aggressor, he believed the
danger of losing his life was immediate, and that it was necessary to take the
life of the deceased in order to save himself.162 These are elements that a
defendant must show in order for the homicide to be deemed justified
because it was committed in self-defense.163
150 Id.
151 Id.; see also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914), State v. Phillips
187 A. 721 (Del. 1936).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Cooper 512 A.2d at 1006 (citing Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 312 (D.C.
1979)).
155 Id. at 1004.
156 Gainer, 391 A.2d at 860-61.
157 Id.







Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
Because Maryland still has other safeguards in place, like imminence and
necessity, along with justified homicide, it should eliminate a duty to retreat
and follow in the footsteps of the majority of states.16 This standard would
result in the defendant not being guilty at the moment they decide to fight
back.165 Instead, like other states' approaches, fighting back would simply be
one factor considered before determining the defendant's guilt. 166  This
allows the court to evaluate other factors, such as the size of the person using
self-defense compared to the deceased.167 It also allows the court to take into
account other influences such as separation assault for victims of domestic
abuse.168
Pennsylvania's law is a good example of how stand your ground laws can
be enacted to provide a bright-line rule for juries in evaluating the level of
threat.'69 Since determining if threat is imminent can be especially difficult,
requiring the assailant to have a lethal weapon allows juries to narrow the
definition of "imminence" and "threat."170 This would make the overall
process more efficient.17 1
Abolishing a duty to retreat and enacting a stand your ground law would
also better protect innocent victims.172 It would afford victims a law that no
longer puts their self-defense actions at the focus of criminal law but rather
the assailant's acts.173 As the application of stand your ground laws have
demonstrated, other safeguards can be employed more effectively.174
The standard of imminence and necessity is already required in
Maryland.175 Therefore, enacting a stand your ground law in Maryland
would allow individuals, who have a reasonable belief that danger of death is
imminent and that the use of deadly force is necessary, to use such force
against their attacker without first having to retreat.176 The city of Baltimore
has the second highest murder rate of major U.S. cities, as of October
2016.7 This number has risen considerably over the last five years, with
164 Pollet, supra note 119, at 40-4 1; Imperial, supra note 119, at 10.
165 Id.
'I See Little, 111 So.3d at 214.
167 Id.
168Id
169 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505 (2017).
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Barlow, 303 Kan. at 804.
173 Id.
174 See Little, 111 So.3d at 214, Ray, 359 P.3d at 614.
'7 Crawford, 190 A.2d at 542.
176 Id.
1n Michael B. Sauter et al., Most Dangerous Cities in America, USA TODAY (Oct. 1,
2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2016/10/01/most-
dangerous-cities-america/91227778/ (citing the FBI's 2015 Uniform Crime Report).
I78 Id.
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2015 being its deadliest year yet.179 In a state with a city that has a
dramatically rising crime level, stand your ground is almost necessary.180
The risk of violence in this state is great and an individual should not face
criminal prosecution for doing what is reasonably necessary to protect
themselves.18 1
This high crime rate applies not only to homicide cases, but also to crimes
against women.182 "One out of every eight adult women, or about 260,000
adult women out of 2.1 million women living in Maryland, has been the
victim of forcible rape sometime in her lifetime."1 83  These statistics
demonstrate that crimes against women are also a strong concern in
Maryland.184 Enacting stand your ground will resolve the duty to retreat's
disproportionate impact on females, while promoting public policy that
ensures protection for innocent victims and encourages domestic violence
victims to leave the abuse. 185
V. CONCLUSION
Maryland's duty to retreat promotes a problematic public policy by
putting the victim's self-defense actions at the focus of criminal acts instead
of the assailant's acts.18 6 Enacting stand your ground will take the focus
away from the victim's action by making it a consideration for the jury
instead of an automatic offense. 187 It will also resolve the duty to retreat's
disproportionate impact on females while promoting public policy that
ensures protection for the innocent, while also encouraging domestic
violence victims to leave their abusers.88
And while legislatures may fear that stand your ground laws will lead to
abuse, the safeguards that other states have in place can better protect against
17' Kevin Rector, Deadliest Year in Baltimore History Ends with 344 Homicides,
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Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground
this abuse.'89 These safeguards could include using imminence and necessity
as factors for the jury to consider,'90 having a failure to retreat instead if the
jury determines under all circumstances the act was not truly in self-
defense,'9' or making a bright-line rule for what constitutes a threat by
employing a lethal weapon requirement.192  Employing one of these
safeguards in a stand your ground law will protect the policy concerns of the
Maryland legislature while still protecting innocent victims. This will
ultimately lead to a public policy that protects the innocent while
discouraging abuse of self-defense as a defense.
189 Id.
190 Id.
19 Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004-05 (D.C. 1986).
192 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN § 505(b)(2.3) (West 2016).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
BROWN V. STATE: UNDER THE TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES, A SUSPECT IS IN CUSTODY FOR
MIRANDA PURPOSES WHEN HE IS TRANSPORTED
DIRECTLY FROM A HOSPITAL TO AN INTERROGATION
ROOM.
By: Edward S. Shields III
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a suspect was in a custodial
environment during the six minutes of his interrogation before he was read
his Miranda rights. Brown v. State, 452 Md. 196, 156 A.3d 839 (2017). The
court held that within the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would not have felt free to leave. Id. Lastly, the significant restraint on
Brown's freedom of movement which rose to the level of a formal arrest,
further created a custodial environment. Id. at 219, 156 A.3d at 852.
In October 2014, there was a reported shooting at Elks Lodge. An
anonymous 911 caller reported that he was injured and driving a vehicle to
the Hurlock Village Apartments. An officer responded and observed the
vehicle in question. The officer witnessed Terrance J. Brown ("Brown")
exiting the vehicle. When Brown left the officer's line of vision, the officer
approached the car and noticed dried blood in the passenger area. Brown
was subsequently transported to the hospital. Because of the dried blood,
police towed Brown's vehicle to the station while he was still in the hospital.
They also sent Detective Howard ("Howard") to the hospital to obtain
information from Brown regarding the shooting.
At the hospital, Howard approached Brown with his weapon and badge
clearly visible. Howard told Brown that he was there to "obtain" him. He
further asked Brown to consent to coming back to the station to give a
statement. Brown was placed in the rear passenger seat, without handcuffs,
while wearing hospital scrubs, and a bandage on his head. The marked
police car then transported Brown to the station.
Once they arrived at the station, Brown was brought in through an
entrance not available to the public and led directly to an interrogation room.
A detective interrogated Brown for six minutes before issuing Miranda
warnings. When Brown was being advised of his rights, he asked if he was
under arrest to which the interviewing detective responded in the negative.
After the warnings were issued, Brown repeatedly asked if he could go
home. At the end of the interview Brown was arrested for homicide.
Brown was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related
charges in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. He filed and was
granted a motion to suppress the statements made before he was read his
Miranda rights. The State appealed the circuit court's decision. The Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the ruling of the circuit court in an
unreported opinion, holding that Brown was not in custody under the totality
34
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of the circumstances. Brown then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
which was granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
The issue before the Court of Appeals of Maryland was whether Brown
was in custody for the purposes of Miranda during the entirety of his
interrogation. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 846. A confession is
inadmissible if it was elicited without conforming to Miranda. Brown, 452
Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 846 (citing Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 173-74, 699
A.2d 1170, 1178). The Court in Miranda found that a custodial
interrogation's coercive nature makes it difficult to determine whether
statements are voluntary. Brown, 452 Md. at 210, 156 A.3d at 846 (citing
U.S. v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435, 120 S.Ct. at 2331). Miranda further held
that an individual in custody must be informed of certain rights prior to
interrogation in order to protect his Fifth Amendment rights. Id.
In determining whether an individual is in a custodial environment
requiring the reading of Miranda rights, an objective inquiry is made based
on the totality of the circumstances. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at 847
(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128
L.Ed.2d 293). Based on these circumstances, the court must determine
whether there is a restraint on an individual's freedom of movement to a
degree associated with a formal arrest. Brown, 452 Md. at 209, 156 A.3d at
847 (citing U.S. v. Thompson, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. at 465, 133
L.Ed.2d 383) (1995)). In making this determination, the court will look at
the following factors: when and where the interrogation occurred, whether
the defendant was questioned as a suspect or witness, the length of the
interrogation, the events leading to the interrogation, how the defendant
arrived to be questioned, and subsequent events after the interrogation. Id. at
211, 156 A.3d at 847. Lastly, the court will evaluate whether a reasonable
person would have felt at liberty to terminate the interrogation. Id. at 210,
156 A.3d at 847.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that Brown's freedom of
movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Brown, 452 Md. at 212, 156 A.3d at 848. A reasonable person in Brown's
situation, dressed in a hospital gown, suffering from multiple gunshot
wounds and without access to his vehicle, would have felt unable to leave or
refuse the offer to go to the station. Id. at 213-14, 156 A.3d at 849. The
court further stated that the lower court's factual finding that Brown's
acquiescence to Howard indicated a lack of voluntariness within the totality
of the circumstances. Id. at 213, 156 A.3d at 848. Based on these findings,
the court found that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and
that Brown's degree of movement was restricted, similar to that of a formal
arrest. Id. at 219, 156 A.3d at 852.
The dissenting opinion highlighted certain facts and de-emphasized other
facts. Brown, 452 Md. at 220, 156 A.3d at 852-53. The dissent stated that
the following facts should have been given equal weight as those in the
majority opinion: Brown being told he was going to the station as a victim,
not being handcuffed, repeatedly told he was not under arrest, not being
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restrained at any time before or during the interrogation, the interrogator not
being armed, and his statements being made very early in the interrogation.
Id. at 221, 156 A.3d at 853. Furthermore, the dissent a tacked the majority's
reliance on the circuit court's use of the word "acquiesced" when they
described Brown's response to Howard picking him up from the hospital. Id.
at 224, 156 A.3d at 855. The dissent stated that the majority relied too
heavily on the lower court's use of the term acquiesce, rather than consent,
when describing how Brown was taken to the police station. Id. at 224, 156
A.3d at 855. The dissent also posited that even if Brown felt he was not free
to leave, within the totality of the circumstances, that fact did not show the
restraint on freedom of movement to the degree of a formal arrest. Id. at
225, 156 A.3d at 856.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Brown's freedom of
movement was restricted to the degree of a formal arrest and that Brown's
interrogation was custodial for Miranda purposes. This ruling strengthens the
rights of defendants by only allowing legally obtained voluntary statements
to be used against them. This holding further emphasizes how important it is
for police to read a suspect their Miranda rights before interrogation begins.
The state should stress to police the importance of handling interrogations
with care because the state could lose inculpatory evidence based on police
failing to "Mirandize" a suspect. By broadening the definition of custodial
interrogation, police may have a harder time following the guidelines set
forth in this case. Police often use certain interrogation techniques to quickly
obtain information, and this ruling could make it more difficult for police to
gather necessary information to solve cases.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
COPSEY V. PARK: WHEN RELEVANT AND NECESSARY, A
DEFENDANT MAY PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A NON-
PARTY'S NEGLIGENCE TO PROVE THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS EITHER NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT A
SUPERSEDING CAUSE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALLEGED
HARM.
By: Genevieve Hornik
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a non-party's
negligence is admissible if it is relevant and necessary for the defendant o
prove that they were either not negligent or that other independent causes
contributed to the alleged harm. Copsey v. Park, 453 Md. 141, 148, 160
A.3d 623, 626-27 (2017). Evidence of a non-party's negligence is necessary
to provide a defendant a fair trial because the jury needs the evidence to
determine causation. Id. at 156, 160 A.3d at 632. Therefore, the court held
that any alleged prejudice caused by admitting the evidence did not outweigh
its probative value. Id.
Lance D. Copsey ("Copsey") went to the emergency room on February 4,
2010, after slipping, falling, and hitting his head during a game of
racquetball. After a normal CT scan, Copsey was released from the hospital.
Copsey sought medical treatment on May 26 and June 1, 2010, due to his
worsening symptoms. On June 4, 2010, Dr. Charles Iliff ("Dr. Iliff') ordered
a CT scan and MRI/MRA for Copsey. The defendant, Dr. Park, interpreted
the results and reported that the images were normal. On June 5, 2010 Dr.
Larry Blum ("Dr. Blum") independently reviewed the MRI and MRA images
and concurred there were no abnormalities.
On June 9, 2010, after Copsey's symptoms returned, he visited Dr. Blum
who ordered a new MRI and requested an urgent interpretation of the image.
Dr. Vijay Viswanathan ("Dr. Viswanathan") interpreted the MRI and noted
abnormalities, including brain cell death caused by insufficient flow of
blood. Dr. Viswanathan failed to relay his findings to Dr. Blum or Copsey.
Thereafter, Dr. Blum reviewed the images with Copsey, without Dr.
Viswanathan's report, found no abnormalities, and released Copsey from the
hospital. After Copsey went home, Dr. Viswanathan discussed the abnormal
results of the MRI with Dr. Damanhuri Alkaitis ("Dr. Alkaitis"), the
covering physician for Dr. Blum. Copsey was never told about the abnormal
scan and suffered a stroke the next day. He died on June 13, 2010 from
complications related to the stroke.
On September 27, 2011, Jenny J. Copsey ("Mrs. Copsey") filed survival
and wrongful death actions against Dr. Park, Dr. Viswanathan, Dr. Blum,
and Dr. Alkaitis. All the parties, aside from Dr. Park, were dismissed
following pre-trial settlements. Mrs. Copsey filed a motion in limine to
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exclude evidence relating to Dr. Blum's and Dr. Alkaitis' prior statuses as
defendants. She also attempted to prevent Dr. Park from raising the defense
that the negligence of subsequent reating physicians lead to Copsey's death.
The circuit court denied both motions. On September 24, 2014, the jury
found that Dr. Park did not breach the standard of care and acted as a
reasonable physician under the circumstances. Copsey filed a timely appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, upholding the
introduction of evidence of a non-party's negligence and causation. Mrs.
Copsey filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to determine if the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of non-party subsequent treating physicians' negligence. It also
analyzed whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on superseding
cause, when the negligence of all the treating physicians amounted to one
indivisible injury, Copsey's death.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began by reviewing the lower court's
reliance on Martinez in allowing evidence of non-party negligence to be
admitted. Copsey, 453 Md. at 159, 160 A.3d at 633. Martinez justified the
admittance of evidence of prior third parties' negligence in a medical injury
case. Copsey, 435 Md. at 159, 160 A.3d at 633 (citing Martinez v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 212 Md.App. 634, 70 A.3d 397). Mrs. Copsey argued that
Martinez did not apply since the Martinez court dealt with evidence prior to
the physician's treatment. In contrast, Dr. Park argued that the evidence of
superseding negligence broke the causal link. Copsey, 435 Md. at 158, 160
A.3d at 633. Mrs. Copsey further claimed that the lower court erred by
allowing evidence of non-parties' negligence, because it diverted the jury's
attention away from Dr. Park's actions. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 632.
Furthermore, she claimed that the admission could sway the jury into finding
that all the guilty parties had settled leaving the only innocent party, Dr.
Park, to fight the suit on his own. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 632. The court
ultimately applied Martinez since it addressed whether a physician accused
of negligence could present evidence of a non-party's negligence as a
defense. Id. at 161, A.3d at 635. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found
that the issue of whether the non-parties' treatment of the patient was before
or after the accused physician's treatment was irrelevant. Id. Instead, the
court found the relevant issue to be whether the jury had a materially
complete picture of the facts. Id. at 161-62, A.3d at 635. Because barring
evidence of the non-parties' negligence would have given the jury an
incomplete picture of the facts, the court found the evidence relevant and
admissible. Id.
Next, the court reviewed the trial court's jury instruction on superseding
cause. Copsey, 435 Md. at 163, A.3d at 636. A superseding cause defense
arises when "unusual" and/or "extraordinary" independent intervening
negligent acts occur. Copsey, at 166, 160 A.3d at 637 (citing Pittway Corp.
v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 249, 973 A.2d 771, 789(2009)). Mrs. Copsey
argued that Dr. Park's negligence began a six-day delay that proximately
caused Copsey's death. Copsey, 435 Md. at 158, 160 A.3d at 633. Dr. Park
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denied negligence, but argued if he was negligent, he was not the proximate
cause of Copsey's death. Id. at 165, 160 A.3d at 636. He claimed that the
evidence showed the superseding negligence of the other treating physicians
broke his causal link to Copsey's death. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 633.
The court noted that both sides presented expert testimony regarding
whether Dr. Park was acting within the standard of care. Copsey, 453 Md. at
167, 160 A.3d at 638. After the testimony, the jury was free to weigh the
evidence and decide whose expert was more credible. Id. at 167, 160 A.3d at
639. The expert testimony supported a reasonable jury finding that Dr. Park's
alleged negligence or the negligence of the superseding doctors caused
Copsey's death. Id. The court stated that because the facts presented
supported more than one reasonable inference, the jury had to determine
whether Dr. Park was a part of a single chain of negligence or if superseding
negligence broke his causal tie to Copsey's death. Id. at 166, 160 A.3d at
638 (citing Pittway, 409 Md. at 253, 973 A.2d at 792). Therefore, the trial
court was correct to give the jury instruction on proximate cause, since the
jury was presented with evidence relevant o proximate cause. Copsey, 453
Md. at 167, 160 A.3d at 638.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a non-party's
negligence is admissible if the evidence is used to prove a defendant is not
negligent or is not the proximate cause of the negligence. This ruling allows
defendants to offer more evidence, apart from their own actions, in defense
of negligent charges against them. This ruling also affects non-party
physicians who treated a plaintiff in a negligence case because it allows for
the non-party physicians' treatment to be scrutinized by a jury. This could
lead to more time and money spent during discovery for medical malpractice




ELECTRICAL GENERAL CORP. V. LABONTE: THE
EXISTANCE OF A SUBSEQUENT INTERVENING INJURY
DOES NOT PRECLUDE AN EMPLOYER FROM LIABILITY
FOR ADDITIONAL PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS.
By: Kelly Gillett
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an employee's subsequent
non-work-related injury did not bar his employer from further liability for the
worsening of his back condition. Elec. Gen. Corp., et al v. Michael L.
LaBonte, 454 Md. 113, 137 164 A.3d 157, 171 (2017). Furthermore, the
court determined that neither the collateral estoppel or case doctrine
prohibited an employee from receiving additional worker's compensation
benefits. Id. at 142-43, 454 Md. at 175. As a result, the court held that the
evidence adduced at trial supported the jury's finding that the employee's
worsening condition was attributable to the work-related injury. Id. at 144,
454 Md. at 176.
On September 2, 2004, Michael LaBonte ("LaBonte") suffered an injury
during the course of his employment with Electrical General Corporation
("Electrical General"). From September 2004 to June 2006, LaBonte filed a
series of claims with the Worker's Compensation Commission
("Commission"). The Commission subsequently determined that he had
sustained a work-related injury and awarded him temporary total and partial
disability. On December 31, 2006, during a traffic stop, an officer pushed
LaBonte against his vehicle, aggravating his back injury.
LaBonte subsequently filed a claim for permanent partial disability
benefits. The Commission granted the benefits requested except for medical
expenses. The Commission found that a greater percentage of the permanent
disability was causally related to the work-injury than the subsequent event
with police officer. In October 2012, the Commission granted LaBonte's
petition to reopen which asserted that his back injury had worsened.
However, the Commission ultimately denied the request for additional
benefits, stating that the subsequent event with the police officer broke the
"causal nexus" between LaBonte's work-injury and his worsening condition.
LaBonte filed a petition for judicial review. At trial, the jury found that
LaBonte's work-injury was causally related to his back condition, and the
worsening of his back condition was solely attributable to the work-injury.
Electrical General filed an appeal. The Court of Special Appeals, affirming,
held that the subsequent intervening accident did not, per se, bar Electrical
General's responsibility for the injury sustained in 2004. Electrical General
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the court granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing the
parties' arguments. LaBonte, 454 Md. at 129, 164 A.3d at 167. Electrical
General asserted that because the Commission found the incident with the
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officer to be a subsequent intervening event; it severed the "causal nexus"
between the disability and the work-injury, and therefore precluded the
employer's liability. Id. LaBonte contended that the worsening of his back
condition was independent from the non-work-related injury. Id. He further
argued that a finding of a subsequent intervening event did not preclude the
employer of further liability under the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at
130, 164 A.3d at 167. Moreover, LaBonte noted that in the case of
permanent disability benefits, liability may be apportioned among multiple
injuries. Id. As such, LaBonte asserted that the jury had the authority to
determine that the work injury was causally related to his worsening
condition, and that the evidence adduced at trial supported these findings. Id.
Next, the court discussed the standard for reviewing the Commission's
interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act. LaBonte, 454 Md. at 131,
164 A.3d at 168. Generally, some deference is given to the Commission's
interpretation, unless the decision is founded on clearly erroneous
conclusions of law. Id. If the Act contains ambiguous language it is to be
construed in favor of the injured employee, but the court cannot create
ambiguities. Id.
The court then conducted a comparative analysis of the present case and
the previous case law relied on by Electrical General. LaBonte, 454 Md. at
133, 164 A.3d at 169. Reeves Motor Co. v. Reeves stated that an employee
with a permanent disability was entitled to benefits for the portion that was
reasonably attributable solely to the work-related injury. Id. at 134, 164
A.3d at 170 (citing Reeves Motor Co. v. Reeves, 204 Md. 576, 582-83, 105
A.2d 236, 239-40 (1954)). The court stated that it was the role of the
Commission to determine these factual matters. Id. at 137, 164 A.3d at 172.
The court rejected Reeves and found that the Commission's determination
that an independent subsequent injury automatically breaks the causal nexus
between the work injury and the worsening condition. Id. In turn, the court
held that an employer may be liable for the worsening of an employee's
permanent disability caused by and reasonably attributable solely to the
work-related injury. Id.
Next, the court discussed whether the law of the case doctrine or the
doctrine of collateral estoppel applied. LaBonte, 454 Md. at 140, 164 A.3d
at 173. The law of the case doctrine precludes a party from re-litigating a
legal issue once ruled upon by an appellate court. Id. at 140-41, 164 A.3d at
173 (citing Dep't ofPub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Doe, 439 Md. 201, 216, 94
A.3d 791, 800 (2014)). Similarly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents
the re-litigation of an issue of fact that was crucial to the final judgment
against the same party in a previous action. LaBonte, 454 Md. at 142, 164
A.3d at 174 (citing Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. ofPittsburgh, P.A. v. The Fund
for Animals, Inc., 451 Md. 431, 463-64, 153 A.3d 123, 142 (2017)). The
court concluded that the Worker's Compensation Act permits the
Commission to modify its prior findings, and clearly states that the
Commission is not bound by prior rulings. LaBonte, 454 Md. at 142-43, 164
A.3d at 175. Therefore, neither the doctrine of the law of the case or of
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collateral estoppel barred the Commission from awarding additional benefits.
Id.
Finally, the court examined the evidence from the prior hearings.
LaBonte, 454 Md. at 144-45, 164 A.3d at 176. The court determined that the
evidence provided ample support for the jury's finding that the work injury
caused LaBonte's back condition to worsen. Id. at 145, 164 A.3d at 176
(distinguishing from Reeves where there was no evidence to support the
jury's finding that the employee's work-related shoulder caused his shoulder's
partial immobility). LaBonte's work injury affected his ability to work for
almost two years and required surgery, while the subsequent incident led to
him missing less than 1 month of work along with medication and exercise.
Id. LaBonte presented a medical expert whose testimony supported the
jury's conclusion. Id. Therefore, because the evidence supported the jury's
finding, the trial court did not err by allowing the jury to determine how
much of LaBonte's worsening back condition was attributable to the work-
related injury. Id. at 145-46, 164 A.3d at 177.
The Maryland Appellate Court held that in the case of a permanent
disability, a subsequent intervening act does not necessarily absolve the
employer of further liability. This ruling demonstrates the court's desire to
ensure that the proper safeguards are intact for employees. The Worker's
Compensation Act is designed to protect employees, and this decision will
not allow an employer to automatically deny an employee's right to future
benefits simply because an independent event occurs. Alternatively, this
could result in an increase in frivolous lawsuits, with more people likely to
pursue a claim that is unrelated to their actual work injury. Regardless, the
Commission is required to determine the actual source of a worsening




FUENTES V. STATE: A MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS IS NOT
REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IS
MENTALLY DEFECTIVE; REFERENCING AN INTERVIEW
THAT WAS NOT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT CLOSING
DID NOT AMOUNT TO A REVERSIBLE ERROR;
EMPLOYMENT RECORDS WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED
FROM EVIDENCE.
By: Matthew Braun
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a medical
diagnosis is not required to establish that a victim suffers from a mental
disability as defined under Section 3-301 of the Maryland Criminal Law
Code Annotated ("section 3-301"). Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 326, 164
A.3d 265, 283 (2017). The court also held that, although the prosecutor
acted improperly during closing remarks by referencing an interview that
was not admitted into evidence, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and thus not a reversible error. Id. at 327, 164 A.3d at 283. Lastly, the
court held that the trial court properly excluded over 300 pages of
employment records on relevancy grounds. Id.
Miguel Fuentes ("Fuentes") and Ms. R. were employed at a Marriott
Hotel in Prince George's County and worked together for approximately 14
years. In February of 2012, Fuentes had vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. in a
closet at their place of employment. Ms. R. testified, using two dolls to
communicate, that Fuentes approached her from behind, put his hand over
her mouth and unzipped her pants. Ms. R. then became pregnant with a
daughter and a DNA test determined that Fuentes was the father. At trial, the
jury heard a wide variety of lay testimony corroborating Ms. R.'s disability.
This included testimony about her inability to perform daily tasks by herself,
such as cooking or getting to work. Additionally, Ms. R.'s case manager/job
coach testified that, due to her multiple disabilities, Ms. R. was incapable of
expressing herself.
Fuentes was convicted by jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County of second-degree rape and third-degree sexual offense and was
sentenced to twenty years in prison, with all but twelve years suspended.
Fuentes moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence which the
trial court denied. Fuentes filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court in an unreported
opinion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
Three issues were presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Fuentes, 454 Md. at 302, 164 A.3d at 269. The first issue was whether the
evidence was legally insufficient, since the State failed to present a medical
diagnosis confirming Ms. R.'s mental disorder. Id. Second, the court
analyzed the prosecutor's closing statement to determine if informing the
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jury that Fuentes admitted to taking advantage of Ms. R. in an interview, not
admitted into evidence, was a reversible error. Id. Finally, the court looked
at whether the trial court erred by excluding Ms. R.'s employment records,
since the victim's ability to communicate and understand another's conduct
was fundamental in the jury's determination of her mental competency. Id.
The court began its analysis by discussing the elements required for a
successful conviction of second-degree rape under Section 3-304(a)(2) of the
Maryland Criminal Law Code Annotated ("section 3-304(a)(2)") and for
third-degree sex offense under Section 3-307(a)(2) of the Maryland Criminal
Law Code Annotated ("section "3-307(a)(2)"). Fuentes, 454 Md. at 310, 164
A.3d at 273. Both crimes required the State to prove that Fuentes engaged in
sexual contact or had vaginal intercourse with Ms. R., that Ms. R. was either
mentally defective, incapacitated, or physically helpless rendering her
incapable of consenting, and finally, that Fuentes knew, or should have
reasonably known, that Ms. R. was either mentally defective, incapacitated,
or physically helpless. Id. at 310, 164 A.3d at 273-74. It was undisputed
that Fuentes had both sexual contact and vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. Id.
at 311, 164 A.3d at 274. Therefore, the question became whether the
evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Ms. R. was mentally
defective and, if so, whether Fuentes knew, or reasonably should have
known, about her mental disability. Id.
Fuentes contended that because the terms "mental disorder" and "mental
retardation" are medical diagnoses, the State was required to establish this
through a medical professional. Fuentes, 454 Md. at 311, 164 A.3d at 274.
Because the State failed to establish that Ms. R. was diagnosed with a mental
disorder, Fuentes argued that no rational juror could find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that she suffered from a mental disorder rendering her
incapable of consent. Id. at 307, 164 A.3d at 271. The Court of Appeals
disagreed and held that, under section 3-301(b), evidence of a medical
diagnosis is not required to establish that an individual is mentally defective.
Id. at 314, 164 A.3d at 275.
The court reasoned that the jury was able to watch and observe testimony
from Ms. R., her mother, sister, and case manager/job coach. Fuentes, 454
Md. at 314-15, 164 A.3d at 276. Therefore, the jury was capable of
concluding that Ms. R. was suffering from a mental disability and was a
member of the vulnerable class of individuals that the statutes were designed
to protect. Id. The court further stated that the jury reasonably inferred that
Fuentes knew, or reasonably should have known, of Ms. R.'s disability from
their fourteen-year work relationship. Id.
Next, the court used the harmless error analysis to determine whether the
prosecutor's improper remarks at closing, referencing an interview that had
not been admitted into evidence, were prejudicial to Fuentes and thus a
reversible error. Fuentes, 454 Md. at 321, 164 A.3d at 280. In the interview,
Fuentes allegedly admitted to taking advantage of Ms. R.'s diminished
mental capacity. Id. at 315, 164 A.3d at 276. In weighing the totality of the
evidence against Fuentes, the court found that it was undisputed that he had
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engaged in vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. and that he knew, or should have
known, that she suffered from a mental defect. Id. at 321-22, 164 A.3d at
280. Next, the court looked at the severity of the prosecutor's comments and
found that the while the comments were improper, they did not require
reversal. Id. at 323, 164 A.3d at 281. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court of Appeals considered what remedial measures the trial court used to
cure any potential injustice. Id. at 322, 164 A.3d at 280. It noted that the
trial court had instructed the jury to rely solely on their own memories of the
testimony. Id. Therefore, the court ultimately determined that the State's
comments did not influence the verdict. Id. at 323, 164 A.3d at 281.
Finally, the court decided that the trial court properly excluded Ms. R.'s
employment records from evidence because they were not relevant. Fuentes,
454 Md. at 326, 164 A.3d at 283. The employment records contained
performance evaluations, which Fuentes argued contradicted the State's
claim that Mr. R. suffered from a mental defect. Id. at 324, 164 A.3d at 281.
Under de novo review, the court found that Ms. R.'s ability to perform
different housekeeping tasks was irrelevant when determining if her mental
defect rendered her legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity. Id. at
325-26, 164 A.3d at 282-83. Therefore, the court rejected Fuentes'
arguments and upheld his conviction. Id. at 326-27, 164 A.3d at 283.
In Fuentes, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a medical
diagnosis is not necessary to successfully convict an individual of second-
degree rape or third-degree sex offense. It further held that the prosecutor's
statements at closing did not prejudice Fuentes and thus was not a reversible
error. Finally, the court found that Ms. R.'s employment records were
irrelevant in determining whether her mental disability prohibited her from
consenting to the sexual activity.
Maryland practitioners should be aware that this ruling demonstrates the
court's desire to maintain legislative safeguards protecting individuals
suffering from a mental disability. The court reinforces the statutory shield
designed to protect this vulnerable class of individuals by refusing to raise
the threshold of evidence required to convict someone of certain sexual
offenses. However, practitioners should also be mindful of the door the
court leaves open for potentially unfair prosecutions in the future. By not
requiring a medical diagnosis to establish a party's mental condition and
excluding employment records as evidence, the court makes clear its intent




NORMAN V. STATE: THE ODOR OF MARIJUANA
EMANATING FROM A VEHICLE ALONE DOES NOT
CREATE REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT
A VEHICLE'S OCCUPANT IS ARMED AND DANGEROUS
AND THEREFORE DOES NOT JUSTIFY A FRISK.
By: Shane Rosenbloom
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that without additional
circumstances, the smell of marijuana alone did not create a reasonable
articulable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle was armed and
dangerous. Norman v. State, 452 Md. 373, 156 A.3d 940 (2017). Therefore,
the officer did not have the right to frisk the occupant. Id. The court further
held that in order for a frisk to be justified, there must be circumstances other
than the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle to give rise to
reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupant is armed and dangerous.
Id.
On March 22, 2015, around 9:00 P.M., Trooper Dancho ("Dancho")
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle with Joseph Norman ("Norman") seated
in the passenger seat. Dancho approached the driver's side and detected a
strong odor of raw marijuana arising from the vehicle. All three passengers
were instructed to exit the vehicle and frisked for weapons. While Dancho
was moving Norman's pants pockets, in an attempt to search for weapons, a
bag of marijuana fell on the ground. Dancho then searched the vehicle and
found marijuana in the center compartment along with paraphernalia, to
which Norman admitted sole possession. Dancho subsequently arrested
Norman. Upon a further search at the police barracks, Dancho discovered
another bag of marijuana on his person.
Norman appeared in the Circuit Court of Somerset County on charges of
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana and
possession of paraphernalia. Norman filed a motion to suppress the evidence
claiming it was obtained illegally. The circuit court denied the motion,
finding the frisk reasonable under the totality of the circumstances, since
guns are typically present during drug activity. The court found Norman
guilty of possession of marijuana and sentenced him to nine months of
imprisonment. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, holding
that the odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle gave Dancho the right
to frisk Norman based on the notion that guns typically accompany drug
activity. The Court of Appeals of Maryland then granted certiorari to
determine whether the smell of marijuana emanating from a vehicle creates
reasonable articulable suspicion that all occupants of the vehicle are armed
and dangerous, thus justifying a frisk. Also, the court aimed to determine
whether Dancho had reasonable articulable suspicion that Norman was
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armed and dangerous, based solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from
the vehicle.
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by explaining the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment and the effect of Terry v. Ohio. Norman, 452 Md. at
387-88, 156 A.3d at 948. Under Terry, the Fourth Amendment allows law
enforcement officers to stop an individual if the officer has reasonable
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 388, 156 A.3d at
949 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). If the Terry stop is valid, the
officer must then have reasonable articulable suspicion that a person is armed
and dangerous in order to conduct a Terry frisk. Norman, 452 Md. at 387,
156 A.3d at 948 (citing Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526, 541-42, 144 A.3d
771, 780-81 (2016)).
In assessing the level of danger, a totality of the circumstances analysis is
used to determine whether a reasonably prudent officer in the same situation
would have felt that he or she was in potential danger, thus justifying the
frisk. Norman, 452 Md. at 387, 156 A.3d at 948. In order to conduct a frisk,
the officer's sole purpose must be to uncover any concealed weapons that
could potentially harm them. Id. at 388, 156 A.3d at 948. In its analysis of
prior case law, the court examined whether the odor of marijuana emanating
from the vehicle solely created a reasonable articulable suspicion that all of
the occupants of the vehicle were armed, thus justifying a frisk of Norman.
Id. at 409, 156 A.3d at 961.
Recently, in Robinson v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
that the odor of marijuana alone creates probable cause to search a vehicle,
as this odor indicates evidence of a crime. Norman, 452 Md. at 408, 156
A.3d at 960-61 (citing Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94, 152 A.3d 661 (2017)).
Norman argued that because officers cannot differentiate between criminal
and non-criminal amounts of marijuana, odor alone does not give rise to
reasonable articulable suspicion that a vehicle contains a criminal amount of
marijuana. Norman, 452 Md. at 409, 156 A.3d at 961. However, the court
in Robinson stated that any odor of marijuana gives rise to probable cause to
search a vehicle, as officers cannot distinguish the amount of marijuana that
is present. Norman, 452 Md. at 409-410, 156 A.3d at 961. Because
Robinson did not address whether the odor of marijuana gives rise to
reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk nor did it mention guns, the court
ultimately found Norman's argument meritless. Id. at 411, 156 A.3d at 962.
Although Robinson justified Dancho's search of the vehicle based on the
odor of marijuana, it did not justify his frisk of Norman. Norman, 452 Md.
at 411, 156 A.3d at 962. This was due to the Court of Appeals' finding that
odor alone was insufficient to create a reasonable articulable suspicion that
Norman was armed and dangerous. Id. While odor alone was not sufficient,
the court summarized possible circumstances that may justify a frisk of a
vehicle's occupant when the only other factor present is the odor of
marijuana. Norman, 452 Md. at 426-27, 156 A.3d at 971. In these cases, the
occupants exhibited extreme nervousness, made stealthy movements inside
the vehicle, and provided false identification to the officer. Id. The instant
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case was devoid of any of these additional circumstances. Id. Also, risk of
harm to the officers was minimized, since Dancho called for backup and
when the frisk occurred, the officers were no longer outnumbered. Id. at
427, 156 A.3d at 972.
The court held that there was no justification to frisk Norman, since the
only factor present was the odor of marijuana. Norman, 452 Md. at 426-27,
156 A.3d at 971. Throughout the stop, Norman remained calm, made no
attempt to flee and gave his correct identification to Dancho. Id. There were
no additional circumstances to suggest Norman was armed and dangerous.
The court found that a reasonably prudent officer in Dancho's position would
not have feared that Norman was armed and dangerous. Id. at 427, 156 A.3d
at 972. Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances it was
unreasonable for Dancho to conduct a frisk. Id.
The dissenting opinion focused on the importance of officer safety.
Norman, 452 Md. at 432, 156 A.3d at 974. Specifically, the dissenters
argued that it was reasonable under the totality of circumstances to frisk
Norman based on the notion that guns typically accompany drug activity. Id.
at 432, 156 A.3d at 974-75. Furthermore, they noted that deference should
be given to the reasonable inferences of the officer based on his training,
knowledge and experience. Id. at 434, 156 A.3d at 975-76 (citing U.S. v.
Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164 (1998)).
In Norman, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that an officer does
not have reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk Norman based solely on the
smell of marijuana. This holding will substantially impact criminal law in
Maryland, as it may now be easier to challenge a frisk when the only
justification present is the odor of marijuana. The courts will have to
determine what additional circumstances rise to the level of reasonable
articulable suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous, thus justifyiing a
frisk of that person. While acknowledging the importance of officer safety,
the court protects the right against unreasonable search and seizures
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
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PARKER V. HAMILTON: UNDER MARYLAND RULE 5-201, A
MINOR PLAINTIFF'S WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIM IS
TOLLED UNTIL THE AGE OF MAJORITY; A CLAIM IS
FURTHER TOLLED IF IT CONTAINS SUFFICIENT
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUDULENT CONDUCT WHICH
BARRED THE PLAINTIFF FROM FILING A CLAIM.
By: Rebecca Malkowski
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a minor's claims for
wrongful death were tolled because both Section 5-201 and 5-203 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings of the Maryland Code ("section 5-201"),
("section 5-203") were satisfied. Parker v. Hamilton, 453 Md. 127, 129-30,
160 A.3d 615, 615 (2017). The court held that under section 5-201, the time
to bring a claim of wrongful death tolled during the period of one's minority.
Id. at 129, 160 A.3d at 616. In addition, the court held that a claim of
wrongful death was tolled when the plaintiff successfully pled that a
defendant's fraudulent behavior barred him or her from filing a claim. Id. at
129-30, A.3d at 616.
On or about August 22, 2009, Mr. William Hamilton ("Hamilton") shot
and killed his thirty-eight-year-old farmhand, Mr. Craig Junior Parker ("Mr.
Parker"). Mr. Parker left behind two family members, his mother, Cassandra
Parker ("Cassandra") and his son ("Z"). On June 9, 2015, Cassandra, the
personal representative of Mr. Parker's estate, and Z filed a complaint
against Hamilton in the Circuit Court for Dorchester County. This complaint
included actions of survival and wrongful death against Hamilton.
Shortly after filing suit, Cassandra amended the complaint to include a
claim of fraud. This claim alleged that after Hamilton killed Mr. Parker, he
buried the remains to conceal the crime. In response to this action, Hamilton
filed both a motion to dismiss with prejudice and a motion for summary
judgment. The court granted Hamilton's motion to dismiss the claims of
wrongful death, finding that they were time-barred under Section 3-904 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings of the Maryland Code ("section 3-904").
Cassandra filed an appeal to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari before the lower court
could consider the appeal. The first issue presented was whether the trial
court improperly ignored section 5-201 when it determined that the minor
plaintiffs wrongful death claims were not tolled until the age of majority.
Secondly, the court considered whether the dismissal of plaintiffs claim
violated his rights under Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Lastly, it examined whether the trial court erred in concluding that the
fraudulent concealment of murder did not toll the claim of wrongful death
under section 5-203.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by discussing
section 5-201 and its ability to toll wrongful death claims during the period
of minority. Parker, 453 Md. at 134, 160 A.3d at 619. In reviewing the
language of the statute, the court found that the time to file begins to accrue
after the age of majority is reached. Thus, one has three years after reaching
the age of majority to file the action. Id.
The statute's original language limited the time to bring the claim to
twelve months after the victim's death. Parker, 453 Md. at 135, 160 A.3d at
620. However, the timeframe was eventually extended to three years due to
the General Assembly's intent to treat wrongful death the same as a claim of
negligence. Id. This decision was also influenced by Waddell v.
Kirkpatrick. Parker, 453 Md. at 136, 160 A.3d at 620 (citing Waddell v.
Kirkpatrick, 331 Md. 52, 52-56, 626 A.2d 353, 353-55 (1993)). The Waddell
court applied section 3-904 in barring a daughter's claim for wrongful death
when she waited until she was 20 years old to file. Id. Pursuant to section 3-
904, the Waddell court found that the time to bring a claim of wrongful death
was a condition precedent as opposed to a statute of limitations. Parker, 453
Md. at 137, 160 A.3d at 620-21.
In response to Waddell, the General Assembly amended the language of
section 5-201 to reference its application to wrongful death claims. Parker,
453 Md. at 137, 160 A.3d at 621. Specifically, section 5-201 now allowed
the period to file a claim of wrongful death to be tolled by a plaintiff's
minority. Parker, 453 Md. at 137-38, 160 A.3d at 621. By applying section
5-201 to the instant case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland determined that
the language of the statute allowed for the tolling of wrongful death claims
during the period of one's minority. Id. at 138, 160 A.3d at 621. As a result,
Z's claims were tolled due to his minority under section 5-201. Id.
The court next addressed whether the trial court's decision that
Cassandra's claims were not tolled violated Z's rights under Article 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Parker, 435 Md. at 131, 160 A.3d at 617.
Cassandra argued that it would be a violation under Article 19 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights if the court did not allow for the tolling until
the age of majority. Id. at 138-39, 160 A.3d at 621. However, the court
explained that because the language in section 5-201 provided for tolling, it
was not necessary to discuss the constitutional issue. Id.
Finally, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in its
determination that Parker's allegation of fraud failed to toll the plaintiffs
wrongful death claim under section 5-203. Parker, 453 Md. at 139, 160
A.3d 615 at 622. Under section 5-203, if knowledge of a cause of action was
kept from the adverse party because of fraud, the cause of action should not
begin accruing until the fraud is discovered. Id. at 129, 160 A.3d at 616.
The time limitations on filing wrongful death claims begin tolling when the
defendant engages in fraudulent behavior preventing the plaintiff from
bringing a wrongful death action within three years. Id.
In analyzing Cassandra's allegation of fraud, the court explained that the
amended complaint sufficiently asserted Hamilton's fraudulent conduct
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under section 5-203. Parker, 453 at 139-40, 160 A.3d at 622. Section 5-203
requires that one must provide sufficient facts of fraud rather than mere
allegations. Parker, 160 A.3d 615 at 622 (citing Antigua Condo. Ass'n v.
Melba Inv'rs Atl., Inc., 307 Md. 700, 735, 517 A.2d 75, 93 (1986)).
Cassandra's complaint identified that Hamilton killed Mr. Parker and
proceeded to bury his remains afterwards. Therefore, the court decided that
Parker's allegations regarding Hamilton's actions were enough to be deemed
fraudulent. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Circuit Court of
Dorchester County erred in dismissing Parker's claims of wrongful death as
untimely. Parker, 453 Md. at 129-30, 160 A.3d at 616. The court also held
that the trial court erred in its determination that Hamilton's fraudulent
conduct did not toll Cassandra's claim. Id. This holding creates a bright-line
rule for minor plaintiffs to bring a claim of wrongful death. Specifically, this
case holds that minors have three years after reaching the age of majority to
bring the claim. This is imperative to Maryland law because it will allow
minors more opportunity to recover on wrongful death claims.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
ROGERS V. HOME EQUITY USA, INC.: A LEAD PAINT
EXPOSURE CLAIM CAN SURVIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BY ESTABLISHING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
A REASONABLY PROBABLE SOURCE OF THE LEAD
POISONING.
By: Hayley C. Lucas
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a plaintiff can survive
summary judgment if the circumstantial evidence demonstrates that the
subject property was a reasonably probable source of his lead poisoning.
Rogers v. Home Equity USA, Inc., 453 Md. 251, 277, 160 A.3d 1207, 1223
(2017). The court further ruled that a plaintiffs use of purely circumstantial
evidence does not require him to rule out other potential sources of lead
exposure. Id. at 268, 160 A.3d at 1217. Therefore, the trial court erred when
it granted summary judgment on the issues of source and source causation.
Id. at 277, 160 A.3d at 1223.
In October 1996, Terrance Rogers ("Rogers") and his mother moved into
a row home owned by Home Equity USA, Inc. ("Home Equity"). They lived
at the Home Equity property for approximately six months. Between June of
1995 and August of 1997 Rogers' blood lead levels were tested six times.
The test results revealed that Rogers' blood lead levels were elevated and
remained elevated during his tenancy at the Home Equity property. In
addition, the tests revealed that Rogers' blood lead levels declined after he
vacated the Home Equity property.
In May 2013, Rogers filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City against Home Equity for negligence. Rogers alleged that he was
poisoned by lead-based paint as a toddler while living at the Home Equity
property and suffered permanent brain damage as a result. Rogers
introduced evidence that the interior of the Home Equity property had tested
positive for lead-based paint in 1976. There was also no evidence indicating
that a full lead abatement had ever been performed on the property. In
addition, Rogers presented reports from Dr. Simon and Dr. McDaniel, who
both concluded that the Home Equity property was a substantial contributing
source to Rogers' lead poisoning. Dr. McDaniel testified that it took thirty to
forty-five days for blood tests to accurately reflect the level of lead exposure.
Therefore, Rogers' increased lead levels while living at the Home Equity
property indicated that the property was a significant source of his exposure.
In December 2014, Home Equity moved for summary judgment. Home
Equity argued that Rogers had failed to rule out all other possible sources of
lead exposure. Therefore, Rogers could not survive summary judgment on
the issues of source and source causation of his lead poisoning. The trial
court granted summary judgment and Rogers filed a timely appeal. The
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment on the issue
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of source causation alone. Rogers filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which
the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment de novo, and in the light most favorable to Rogers.
Rogers, 453 Md. at 262, 160 A.3d at 1214. Rogers argued that he had
presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment on both source and
source causation, thus he was not required to rule out other possible sources
of lead exposure. Id. at 263, 160 A.3d at 1214. The court noted that to
defeat a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff is only required to show a
reasonable probability that the property was a source of the lead exposure
and poisoning. Id. at 264-65, 160 A.3d at 1215. As a result, the plaintiff was
not required to conclusively establish the issues of source and source
causation. Id. at 265, 160 A.3d at 1215.
Next, the court addressed whether Rogers had presented sufficient
evidence to survive summary judgment by analyzing the two theories of
causation for lead paint cases. Rogers, 453 Md. at 265-66, 160 A.3d at 1215-
16. The court proceeded under the theory of causation used in Hamilton v.
Kirson which allows a plaintiff to "rule in" the subject property as a
reasonably probable source through substantial circumstantial evidence. Id.
at 266, 160 A.3d at 1216 (citing Hamilton v. Kirson, 439 Md. 501, 527-28,
96 A.3d 714 (2014)). Under a Kirson theory of causation, to survive
summary judgment Rogers was not required to rule out all other possible
sources of lead exposure. Rogers, 453 Md. at 266, 160 A.3d at 1216. Instead,
he had to present sufficient evidence related to the subject property. Id. The
court noted the quality and quantity of circumstantial evidence provided by
Rogers was sufficient for a jury to reasonably infer that the Home Equity
property contained lead-based paint during the time Rogers resided there.
Rogers, 453 Md. at 270-72, 160 A.3d at 1218-20 (citing Kirson, 439 Md. at
544, 96 A.3d 714; Hamilton v. Dackman, 213 Md. App. 589, 75 A.3d
327(2013)).
The court next considered Dr. McDaniel's testimony. Rogers, 453 Md. at
271, 160 A.3d at 1219. Dr. McDaniel testified that Rogers' blood lead levels
would have decreased about thirty days after the exposure had ended.
However, they remained elevated until Rogers vacated the Home Equity
property. Id. From Dr. McDaniel's testimony, a jury could reasonably infer
that the Home Equity property was a reasonably probable source of his lead
exposure. Id. at 272, 160 A.3d at 1219-20. Therefore, the court held that
summary judgment was improperly granted on this issue. Id. at 273, 160
A.3d at 1220.
Next, the court addressed source causation. Specifically, the court
focused on whether Rogers presented sufficient evidence to support an
inference that it was reasonably probable that the lead exposure at the Home
Equity property contributed to his injury. Rogers, 453 Md. at 273, 160 A.3d
at 1220. Under Kirson, Rogers was only required to show that the Home
Equity property was a substantial contributing factor to his injury. Id. The
court determined that a jury could reasonably conclude from the blood tests
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that because Rogers' blood lead levels had not declined while living at the
Home Equity property, the property had contributed to his lead poisoning.
Id. at 276-77, 160 A.3d at 1222-23. Thus, the court held that summary
judgment was improperly granted on the issue of source causation. Id.
Concluding that Rogers had provided enough evidence to establish both
source and source causation, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
summary judgment was improperly granted. Id. at 277, 160 A.3d at 1223.
The dissenting opinion argued that the majority extensively reduced the
burden of proof a plaintiff must meet to avoid summary judgment in a lead
paint negligence claim. Rogers, 453 Md. at 284, 160 A.3d at 1227. The
dissent further asserted that the majority's "rule in" theory provided no clear
basis in law or public policy and, therefore, may be difficult for the trial
courts to apply. Id. at 287, 160 A.3d at 1228.
In Rogers, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held for the first time that a
lead paint plaintiff may survive summary judgment through substantial
circumstantial evidence without ruling out other possible sources of lead
exposure. This decision protects future plaintiffs who may lack the
necessary resources to eliminate other potential sources of exposure.
Plaintiffs facing the difficulties of proof will now have an alternative method
to establish a subject property as a reasonably probable source of lead
exposure. In addition, this theory of causation is favorable to plaintiffs who
wait to bring their claims until several years after their lead exposure. This is
due to the fact that eliminating other potential sources becomes increasingly
difficult with the passing of time. Accordingly, this decision sets a guiding
principle as to the amount of circumstantial evidence a plaintiff must provide
under a "rule in" theory of causation to survive summary judgment. In doing
so, Rogers resolves the question of how much circumstantial evidence is
sufficient and will prevent inconsistencies in the future.
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STATE V. EBB: A PETITION THAT FAILS TO INCLUDE AN
AVERMENT OF INNOCENCE BUT OTHERWISE COMPLIES
WITH MARYLAND RULE 4-332(d) MAY BE AMENDED IF
DOING SO WOULD DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE; A
WITNESS' RECANTED TESTIMONY IS CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE,
ENTITLING DEFENDANT TO A HEARING.
By: Shaneel Myles
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a petitioner asserted
sufficient newly discovered evidence under Maryland Rule 4-332(d) that
could create a "substantial or significant possibility" that the outcome of his
original trial may have been different. State v. Ebb, 452 Md. 634, 654, 158
A.3d 965, 977 (2017). The newly discovered evidence contained a witness'
recanted testimony, which the prosecution had relied on to secure the
petitioner's conviction. Id. at 658, 158 A.3d at 979. This entitled the
petitioner to a hearing under section 8-301(e) of the Maryland Criminal
Procedure Code. Id. at 660, 158 A.3d at 980. The court further held that a
petition for a writ of actual innocence that complies with the pleading
standards of 4-332(d), but fails to aver actual innocence, may be granted
leave to amend. Id. at 660-61, 158 A.3d at 980-81. However, leave to
amend will only be granted if the court determines that allowing the
amendment would do substantial justice. Id.
In 1993, Jeffrey D. Ebb, Sr. ("Ebb") was convicted of two counts of
felony murder for killing two men during an attempted robbery. The State
produced several witnesses who testified about Ebb's criminal agency, the
most pertinent being Stephanie Stevenson ("Stevenson") and Jerome House-
Bowman ("House-Bowman"). Stevenson testified that she participated in
the robbery, but stated that Ebb, acting alone, shot the victims. House-
Bowman, Stevenson's uncle, corroborated her testimony and testified that
Ebb admitted to him that he committed the robbery, shot three employees
and then described how he fled the scene. Ebb was subsequently convicted
and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
In May 2015, Ebb filed a pro se petition for a writ of actual innocence
under section 8-301 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Code ("section 8-
301"). The petition alleged newly discovered evidence regarding the
credibility of House-Bowman's testimony. In January 2013, House-
Bowman admitted to lying in court at Ebb's trial to save his niece,
Stevenson, from being convicted of murder. Despite the new evidence, the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County denied the petition. The circuit court
found that Ebb only alleged impeaching evidence, rather than material, since
Ebb had been linked to the crime by several witnesses. Furthermore, the
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court stated that because there was overwhelming evidence of Ebb's guilt
outside of House-Bowman's testimony, his recantation would not create a
"substantial possibility of a different outcome." Ebb appealed the circuit
court's denial, which was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. In response, the State appealed and was granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by determining
whether granting Ebb leave to amend his petition, pursuant to Maryland Rule
4-332(i)(1)(B) and (h), would provide "substantial justice." Ebb, 452 Md.
at 660-61, 158 A.3d at 980-81. In its discussion, the court first considered
whether Ebb's petition complied with the pleading requirements of section
8-301(b) and Maryland Rule 4-332(d). Id. at 643, 158 A.3d at 970-71. The
court noted that under section 8-301, the petition is not required to prove its
allegations. Id. at 645, 158 A.3d at 971. Instead, the petition only needs to
assert sufficient grounds for relief in order to be granted a hearing. Id.
(citing Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156, 179, 31 A.3d 250, 267 (2011)).
In the instant case, the court held that Ebb's petition satisfied section 8-
301(b)(3)'s "newly discovered evidence" requirement. Ebb, 452 Md. at
647-48, 158 A.3d at 972-73. Under section 8-301, petitions must also meet
the pleading standard of Maryland Rule 4-332(d)(1)-(13). Id. Rule 4-332
was adopted by the court to provide further clarification on the pleading
requirements of section 8-301(b). Id. Since the rule's adoption, to qualify
as "newly discovered evidence," the new evidence proffered must meet the
standard of Rule 4-332(d)(6) and (8). Id.
The court then analyzed the technical and substantive pleading
requirements of Rule 4-332(d). Ebb, 452 Md. at 649-50, 158 A.3d at 973-
74. Under section 8-301, petitions are not required to be dismissed solely
for failing to comply with Rule 4-332's technical requirements. Id. Rather,
Rule 4-332(h) allows amendments to be freely given to serve "substantial
justice." Id. Additionally, under Rule 4-332(d)(6), the petition must allege
newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time to
move for a new trial, pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-331. Id. at 643-44, 158
A.3d at 970-71. The new evidence must create a "substantial or significant
possibility" that the outcome of the trial may have been different. Id. at 652,
158 A.3d at 975.
In his petition, Ebb asserted that House-Bowman did not recant his false
testimony until 2013, twenty years after his trial. Ebb, Md. 452 at 651, 158
A.3d at 975. Ebb further stated that he had no means of knowing that House-
Bowman would lie under oath and later recant his testimony. Id. Thus, in
analyzing Ebb's petition, the court found that his statements sufficiently
satisfied the newly discovered evidence requirement of Rule 4-332(d)(6).
Id. Furthermore, the court found that the State extensively relied on House-
Bowman's testimony to establish Ebb's guilt. Id. at 657-58 A.3d at 978-79.
This created a "substantial or significant possibility" that the outcome of




Lastly, the court addressed whether Ebb's petition should be dismissed
for failure to aver his innocence, as required by Maryland Rule 4-332(d)(9).
Ebb, 452 Md. at 652-54, 158 A.3d at 975-76. In its analysis, the court
concluded that a petition that only excludes an averment of innocence is not
a sufficient basis for dismissal under section 8-301. Id. at 654, 158 A.3d at
976 (citing Keyes v. State, 215 Md. App. 660, 84 A.3d 141 (2014)). Also,
the court noted that even though Ebb was entitled to a hearing, the ultimate
decision on his claims would be left to the trial court's discretion. Ebb, 452
Md. at 660, 158 A.3d at 980. The court remanded, requiring that Ebb declare
he is "actually innocent" should the lower court grant leave to amend his
petition. Id. at 655, 185 A.3d at 977.
In Ebb, the Court of Appeals of Maryland elaborated on what constitutes
newly discovered evidence that creates a "substantial or significant
possibility" that the outcome of a trial could have been different. The court's
holding demonstrates its leniency in applying the amendment provision of
Maryland Rule 4-332 (i)(1)(B) and (h) to accomplish "substantial justice."
The court further noted that pro se petitions will continue to be liberally
construed. But, despite its leniency, the court expressly requested that Ebb
declare that he is "actually innocent" of the charges against him in his
amended petition. This indicates the court's interest in preserving the writ of
actual innocence for petitioners who have been innocently imprisoned.
Finally, the court emphasized the importance of granting a petitioner's
request for a hearing when they have complied with the pleading
requirements because viva voce communication may be more persuasive than
a written document. Thus, petitioners who have requested and satisfied the
hearing requirements are entitled to the benefit of vocal communication with
a judge under section 8-301(e)(1) and Maryland Rule 4-332(j).
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